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COMMENTS

I

THE PROPOSED MILITARY JUSTICE ACT OF 1967:
FIRST CLASS LEGISLATION FOR "SECOND
CLASS" CITIZENS*
A bill to insure due process in the administration of military justice by prescribing uniform rules of procedures to
be followed by the Armed Forces in the case of administrative discharge boards, by establishing a Judge Advocate
General's Corps in the Navy, by creating single-officer general and special courts-martial, by establishing in each
armed force a Court of Military Review, and for other purposes.'
The proposed Military Justice Act of 1967,2 S.2009, is an omnibus bill which embodies numerous changes to the military criminal and administrative discharge systems. Many will undoubtedly call the changes enlightened. Others will label the bill radical,
burdensome, perhaps even unworkable. In the words of Senator
Sam Ervin upon introducing the bill before the United States Senate: "It is the product of long and painstaking work by the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights. Our purpose is to modernize a system of justice untouched for almost two decades."'
Service in the Armed Forces is one of the very few experiences
common to most male (and many female) citizens of the United
States. For this reason alone comment should be made on any
proposed major change to the criminal and administrative justice
systems which are codified by congressional act and implemented
by the self-contained military establishment. Additional importance is noted for the legal profession because of the many legal
forums and rights to individual counsel available to the serviceman
under the present and proposed systems.
The purpose of this Comment is to examine the Act in its entirety and to note its impact on the military and the problem areas
which may result. Specific analysis will be directed to the more
* The opinions and conclusions presented herein are those of the author
and do not necessarily represent the views of the United-States Army or
any other governmental agency. [Ed. note: The student author is a commissioned officer in the grade of Major on excess leave from the Regular
Army].
1. Preamble, S.2009, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
.2. S.2009, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
For the text of this bill and accompanying remarks by Senator Sam Ervin,
see 113 CONG. REc. 8838-54 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). Joining Senator
Ervin in spcnsoring the bill were Senators Bayh, Bible, Fong, Long and
Williams.
3. 113 CONG. REC. 8838 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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important and controversial proposed amendments and to the deficiencies sought to be corrected by their enactment. Consideration
will also be given to present statutory law and departmental regulations, and to litigation arising thereunder.
I.

BACKGROUND AND PROBLEMS

The proposed Military Justice Act has had an extended formation period. Initial hearings were held in 1962 before the Senate
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the
Judiciary. 4 Lasting seven days, those hearings were held to
review the rights [of servicemen] which Congress had in
mind when the Uniform Code 5 was enacted. For example,
there still are complaints of command control, including
allegations that in some form it has even been exerted upon
defense counsel. A serviceman still may be subjected to
rather dire consequences without the aid of legally trained
counsel. Some indications are found that a soldier receives
one brand of justice; a sailor another; and an airman, a
third. And there have been instances where the safeguards
of "due process" which Congress provided in the Uniform
Code of Military Justice have not been effective.6
Additional impetus for the 1962 hearings was the Annual Report of the Court of Military Appeals for 1960 which noted that
"the unusual increase in the use of the administrative discharge
since the Code became a fixture has led to the suspicion that the
services were resorting to that means of circumventing the requirements of the Code."'7 This "suspicion" engendered a two-pronged
concern for the Subcommittee: what offenses lead to an administrative discharge, and what safeguards are provided the respondent facing an administrative discharge? The concern was a real
one. Any discharge other than the well known "honorable" discharge imparts to the recipient a lifelong stigma and possible
loss of property rights. Thus the Subcommittee desired to inquire
into the military version of administrative due process, especially
where the grounds for discharge were the same as those found in
the punitive articles of the Uniform Code of Military Justice.'
The Subcommittee subjected thirty civilian witnesses, the Department of Defense, and the Departments of the Army, Navy,
and Air Force to intense inquiry. The military services were re4. Hearings on Constitutional Rights of Military Personnel Before
the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Comm. on the Judiciary,
pursuant to S.Res. 260, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [hereinafter cited as
1962 Hearings].
5. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 US.C. §§ 801-940 (1964),
as amended, (Supp. II 1966), formerly 64 Stat. 108-49 (1950) thereinafter
cited as Art ....
, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § ---(1964)].
6. 1962 Hearings 4-5.
7. 1960 Court of Military Appeals Report 12.
8. Art. 77-134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 877-934 (1964).
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quired to submit detailed statistics to explain their adjudicative
procedures and to justify their positions. At the conclusion of the
hearings, the perplexing core problem which confronted the Subcommittee in its attempts to reconcile the administration of justice
in the military was summarized thusly:
Anyone who has attended these hearings is impressed with
the fact that this is a field in which there is room for a good
deal of disagreement on the part of reasonable men as to
exactly what must be done ....

The military force is con-

cerned primarily with defending the security and independence of our Nation. It was not created primarily for the
purpose of administering justice. But in the course of its
activities, it has certainly found it necessary to engage in
the administration of justice, both from the standpoint of
discipline of the Armed Forces, a thing which has to exist
for the efficiency of the Armed Forces, but also for the
purpose of ridding itself of those unfit for service. 9
Based on the 1962 hearings, sixteen individual bills were introduced before the Senate in 1963.10 Each of the bills was intended
to correct an alleged major defect in the military criminal and
administrative discharge systems. Taken as a whole, however, with
some overlapping of legal concepts, the original proposed bills were
aimed at the following broad areas:
(1) The command influence which can be exerted directly
or indirectly by a commander on adjudicative proceedings
convened under his authority.
(2) Additional protection of basic individual rights which
attach in criminal and administrative proceedings in which
such individuals have an interest.
(3) Uniformity among the implementing regulations promulgated and enforced by the individual services.
(4) Prestige and independence for the military lawyer, the
presiding trial officer, and the intermediate tribunals in
the courts-martial appellate chain.
(5) Review procedures designed to provide a more mean9. 1962 Hearings 825.
10. S.2002-17, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963). For the text of these bills
and their accompanying memoranda, see 109 CONG. REc. 13353-68 (daily ed.
Aug. 6, 1963). The bills were reintroduced in 1965 as S.745-60, 89th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1965). See 111 CONG. REC. 4324-41 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1965). Two
additional bills, S.761 and S.762 were introduced at the same time in 1965.
Analysis of these bills is b~yond the purpose of this paper. They are,
however, related to the military justice field. S.761 intended to give jurisdiction to federal district courts to try ex-servicemen no longer under
courts-martial jurisdiction but who committed crimes while in the service
although never tried under the UCMJ. S.762 intended to give jurisdiction to
federal district courts to try civilian employees and dependents who commit certain crimes punishable under the UCMJ while such civilians are
accompanying the military outside the United States. These bills were reintroduced by Senator Ervin on the same date as the Military Justice
Act of 1967, respectively as: S.2006 and S.2007, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967). See 113 CONG. REC. 8835-38 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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ingful scrutiny of all courts-martial and administrative discharge proceedings.
Although the purposes of the sixteen bills were commendable
and generally acceptable, divergent points of view were expressed
prior to and during the 1966 joint hearings held before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary and a Special Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Armed Services." The controversies covered the range of legislative difficulties: from differences on the technical drafting of
otherwise acceptable provisions to disagreement whether the basic
problem sought to be cured was really a problem at all. Such important but vague issues as the proper limits of "due process";
justice versus discipline; whether homosexual tendencies should
constitute grounds for discharge; and how to control "imaginative"
inferences which arise when a commander convenes a court-martial,
among others, elicited irreconcilable opinions among those who testified before the joint Subcommittee. Additional difficulty arose
with the realization that the military should not be hampered by
overly-detailed statutes which would remove discretion, undermine
the flexibility necessary for adjustment to wartime periods, and
not be adaptable to the inherent peculiarities of each of the three
military services. Counterbalancing the possibility of stifling the
military with detailed legislation was the conclusion that Congressional action was needed to give the serviceman rights comparable
to those he would enjoy as a civilian under the protection of recent
Supreme Court decisions on the Bill of Rights' 2 and such codes as
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.13 Some areas of complete agreement led to apparently insoluble and undesirable side
effects. For example, all seemed to concur that no man had a right
to remain in the military if he was unfit, unsuitable, or guilty of
serious misconduct. However, no one could suggest a completely
equitable system for classifying the dischargees. To characterize
all discharges the same would taint the esteem in which the honorable discharge is held. To give an individual any other type of discharge, however, would lead to infamy in civilian
life, thus allowing
4
the military to permanently stigmatize a man.
11. Joint Hearings on S.745-762, S.2906 and S.2907 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Committee on the Judiciary and
a Special Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
12. E.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (right to counsel

at criminal prosecutions); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S* 400 (1965)

(right to

confrontation of witnesses for prosecution); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (the right, and the opportunity to exercise that right, to appointed counsel). Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959) (right of
confrontation at administrative hearings).
13. FED. R. CRaM. P., 18 U.S.C. appendix (1964), as amended, (Supp.
II, 1966).
14. See, e.g., Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1961): "We
think it must be conceded that any discharge characterized as less than
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From this apparent morass emerged the Military Justice Act
of 1967. This omnibus bill is divided into five distinct titles incorporating the main thrust from fourteen of the original sixteen
bills. 15 The five are: Title I, detailed procedures for administrative
discharge boards; Title II, formation of a separate Corps for Navy
Judge Advocates; Title III, numerous important changes to the
Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ); Title IV, transformation of boards of review into the Court of Military Review; and
Title V, consolidation of present service boards into a single Board
for the Correction of Military Records under the Department of
Defense. 16 Taken as a whole, the Act is undoubtedly a compromise
bill. How well it reconciles the rights of individual servicemen,
the necessities of the services, and the adjudicative procedures it
codifies will be the subject of further inquiry.
II.

ADMINISTRATIvE DISCHARGE BOARDS

The provisions for administrative discharge boards (Title I) are
to be placed in title 10 of the United States Code as a new
chapter 17 separate from chapter 47, which deals with the UCMJ.
This is a major concession to the position of the Defense Department. Previously, the desired changes to the administrative discharge system were included in several of the original
bills amending the criminal UCMJ.'8 The Defense Department
contended that the administrative and criminal procedures should
be kept separate, thus not complicating the criminal Code.'0 Although in substantial agreement with the objectives of the proposed legislation, the Department submitted that "this distinction between military justice procedures and administrative procedures is considered essential to the orderly and efficient operation of the Department of Defense. 2 0° Placing administrative procedures in a separate chapter should provide orderliness. It is submitted, however, that the separateness will have a
honorable will result in serious injury." Id. at 858.

See also Murray v.

United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 185 (1961); 1966 Hearings 321, 833-36.
15. The two bills, provisions of which were not incorporated in any
duplicate form, were: S.758 (right to demand court-martial in lieu of administrative discharge board) and S.759 (abolishing summary courts-martial). The Act attempts to provide alternate solutions by (1) guaranteeing
individual rights before administrative boards; and (2) permitting an accused to refuse trial by the summary- court-martial, thus requiring the
convening authority to try him at a special or general court-martial.
The Act also incorporates provisions from two substitute proposals submitted by the Department of Defense. See.1966 Hearings 668-710.
16.' 113 CONG. REc. 8838-54 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
17. The new chapter would be: Administrative Discharge Boards,
ch. 48, 10 U.S.C. §§ 941-66.
18. E.g., S.749 (extension of command influence prohibition to administrative boards by amending Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964)).
19. See Department of Defense views on all previously proposed bills,
1966 Hearings 456-63.
20. 1966 Hearings 12.
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more reaching effect. Heretofore military justice has been synonymous with criminal justice. The Act proposes to change this
concept. As the name Military Justice Act implies, administrative
discharge proceedings are intended to come within the scope of military justice. Many of the rights and procedures to be guaranteed
under the administrative title closely parallel those found in the
criminal Code. It may be therefore concluded that the separate
chapter setting out in effect a "Uniform Code of Administrative
justice similar to
Due Process" will have an impact on military
2
the 1950 law codifying criminal procedures. '
A.

PresentProcedures

Effecting severance of a serviceman's existing relationship
with the military is a complex matter. One service regulation lists
over 200 different factual settings leading to a separation.22 "Separation" is an inclusive term embracing both administrative and
criminal separations. The term includes retirement, resignation,
discharge, dismissal, 23 dropping from the rolls, 24 release from active
duty, 25 operation of law, 26 and death. Separations may be volun-

tary, for example permissive retirement at the end of twenty years
service or discharge at the termination of a lesser service obligation. They may also be involuntarily effected, for example mandatory retirement due to age or discharge by court-martial as part
of the punishment imposed by the court. Further complicating the
separation situation is the "discharge" certificate which is generally
given when the existing military relationship is severed. These
certificates are of certain types which reflect the character of an
individual's service. The types of certificates are honorable, general, undesirable, bad conduct and dishonorable. 27 The first type
21. Art. 1-140, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964).
22. Army Reg. No. 635-5, appendix A (23 Jan. 1967).
23. The term "dismissal" is used in a narrow sense in the military.
It describes the punitive separation of a commissioned officer guilty of a
criminal offense. Only a general court-martial or the President in time of
war may dismiss a commissioned officer. See 10 U.S.C. § 1161(a) (1964).
24. "Dropping from the rolls" describes the action which may be
taken when an officer has been absent without authority for at least three
months or has been sentenced to a federal or state penitentiary by a civilian
court. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. §§ 1161(b), 1163(b) (1964).
25. Applicable only to reserve personnel. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 681
(a) (1964).
26. For example, in the case of 'an enlisted member who receives a
court-martial sentence, as approved by the convening authority, including
a punitive discharge, confinement, or hard labor without confinement, is
automatically reduced to the lowest enlisted grade by operation of law.
Art. 58(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 858(a) (1964). See also 10 U.S.C. §§ 3444-45
(1964) (at expiration of an appointment); 10 U.S.C. § 3544(b) (1964)
(acceptance of an incompatible civil office).

27. An officer does not usually receive a "dishonorable" discharge

certificate. The comparable certificate for an officer is simply titled "discharge certificate." It is, however, characterizedas under "other than hon-
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characterizes "honorable" service. The second denotes service
"under honorable conditions," whereas the last three are for service
"under other than honorable conditions." The latter three discharges are definitely punitive in nature since they denote some inservice impropriety on the part of the recipient. Bad conduct and
dishonorable discharges can be awarded only by courts-martial and only for certain violations of the punitive articles found in the
Uniform Code of Military Justice. 29 An undesirable discharge certificate, although also punitive in nature, is given administratively.
It is this type of certificate, the grounds for which it can be given
and the procedures utilized for its award which are the main areas
sought to be regulated by the first title of the Act. Collectively
these areas are called elimination proceedings.
Commissioned officer separations resulting from elimination
proceedings are presently governed by a variety of statutes, ° which
purport to set out minimum standards for administrative due process. The typical statute provides for notice, counsel, a hierarchy
of boards31 and a hearing at which the officer bears the burden to
show cause 32 why he should not be eliminated. These statutes are
fairly uniform for all the services. Warrant officer elimination
proceedings are also authorized pursuant to statutes, but these
do not attempt to outline any safeguards or protective procedures. 3
Only the grounds, in general terms, are codified. Separations for
cause pertaining to enlisted men, however, are not subject to even
the basic protection of specific statutes. Elimination proceedings
for enlisted personnel are thus subject to regulations "as prescribed
by the Secretary"' 4 of the service concerned. Each of the services
presently has its own implementing regulations governing discharges for both officers and enlisted men. The authority for
such regulations is an exercise in discretion because "the Secretary
is responsible for and has the authority necessary to conduct all
orable conditions." For examples of these certificates see 1962 Hearings
93-98.
28. A general court-martial has jurisdiction to award either a dishonorable or bad conduct discharge, art. 18, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 818 (1964),
whereas a special court-martial has jurisdiction to award only a bad conduct discharge, art. 19, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
29. Except for certain mandatory punishments (e.g., death penalty for
spying in time of war, art. 106, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 906 (1964)), Congress has
given the President authority to prescribe maximum punishment limits,

including punitive discharges. These are found in the
MARTIAL, UNrED STATES,

1951, par. 127(c)

MANUAL FOR CouRTs-

[hereinafter cited as MCM,

19511.
30. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3781 (Army), § 5864 (Navy), § 8791 (Air
Force) (1964); and 14 U.S.C. § 321 (1964) (Coast Guard).

31.

There are generally three boards involved in separating an offi-

cer by elimination: selection board, board of inquiry, and board of review.
32. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 3782 (1964).
33. See, e.g., 10 U.S.C. § 1166 (1964).
34. 10 U.S.C. § 3811(b) (1) (1964).
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affairs of the Department. . . -35 and he may "prescribe regula-

tions to carry out his functions, powers, and duties. .... ,,3
The primary deficiency of individual service regulations is that
they are subject to change at the discretion of the Secretary. In
addition, these regulations have not been uniform among the services.37 Some of the variances have affected such material areas
as grounds for elimination, discretion in the discharge authority
to overrule a board of officers, and rights to be accorded the respondent during the discharge process.
An enlightened attempt to attain uniform standards for
achieving due process in issuing undesirable and general discharges
for cause was made pursuant to a Department of Defense directive
issued to all services in 1959.38 As a result of the 1962 hearings
before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights this directive
was superseded in 1965.39 Both directives applied only to enlisted
men. Under each it was stated that "the policies, standards, and
procedures prescribed herein are applicable to [all services]. ' ' 4°
Nevertheless, the individual services were permitted to promulgate
implementing regulations, and did so.41 Although both directives
carefully set out the proscribed conduct and the procedures which
were to attach to administrative discharges for cause, the implementing regulations presently in effect are not wholly uniform.
In none of the regulations are the basic safeguards less than those
outlined in the current 1965 directive. Yet several deficiencies
remain in this discretionary method of effecting administrative
separations. It is left to each of the services to define the specifics
concerning admissibility of evidence, burden of proof, adequacy
of notice and the extent of the record of any board hearing. Since
the regulations are not uniform, a serviceman in a particular military department not of his choice may be accorded fewer rights
42
than his counterpart in another department of the Armed Forces.
35.
36.

10 U.S.C. § 3012(b) (1964).
10 U.S.C. § 3012(g) (1964).

37. For a detailed comparison of regulations in effect pursuant to
Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14 (14 Jan. 1959), see Dougherty

and Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 33 GEO.
WASH. L.R. 498 (1964). See also 1966 Hearings 774-84.
38. Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Jan. 14, 1959, 25
F.R. 14346 (1959), 32 C.F.R. §§ 41.1-41.9 (Rev. 1961) [hereinafter cited as
1959 Defense Directive I -].
39. Department of Defense Directive No. 1332.14, Dec. 20, 1965, 31
F.R. 705, 19 Jan. 66, 32 C.F.R. § 41.1-41.9 [hereinafter cited as 1966 Defense
Directive I -].
40. See, e.g., 1965 Defense Directive
III.
41. See, e.g., Army Reg. No. 635-212 (July 15, 1966) ("Personnel Separations, Discharge, Unfitness and Unsuitability"); Air Force Manual No.
39-12 (Sept. 1, 1966) ("Separation for Unsuitability, Misconduct, Resignation, or Request for Discharge for the Good of the Service, and Procedures
for the Rehabilitation Program"); Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, C10302 to C-10314, change No. 13.
42. For example, Army regulations require a board of officers to con-
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A comparative analysis of the present directive, regulations
and statutes in light of the proposed legislation will reveal the extent to which these and other deficiencies will be corrected by passage of the Act.
B.

Scope, Definitions and Restrictions on Discharge

The scope of Title I is broad regarding the personnel to be
covered by the proposed provisions, but it is narrow-perhaps too
narrow-as to the conduct proscribed and the types of discharges
which may issue. The Act will insure that no member 43 (enlisted,
warrant, or commissioned) receives a discharge under "other than
honorable conditions" except for conduct supporting allegations of
misconduct, unfitness, or security, 44 and only when such member is
afforded the right to accept or waive the protection of a hearing. 45
Absolute uniformity among all the services should not be an
end unto itself, but it seems reasonable that material rights recognized and extended by one military department should be made
applicable to all services. Under the present system, this uniformity cannot be achieved because even the Department of Defense is
not governed or guided by an inclusive statutory mandate. There
is no control over the Defense Department to prevent it from rescinding the current directive and superseding it with one containing fewer rights for the individual serviceman and increased discretion in the individual departments. This possiblity of internal
change, and the fact that the current directive does not expressly
apply to elimination proceedings for commissioned and warrant
officers, lends an undesirable aura of uncertainty to the present
system. Moreover, and of greatest moment, the present directive
does not contain a complete integration of adequate safeguards
commensurate with the punitive aspects of the elimination proceedings and the undesirable discharge.
By specific reference to their present statutes the "provisions
and procedures of chapter 48" (the new chapter for title 10) would
be made applicable to officer and warrant officer discharges. 46
duct a hearing for every discharge on the ground of "unsuitability," unless
the board is waived. AR 635-212
15.c. (July 15, 1966). Air Force regulations, however, require such a board only for servicemen with more than
eight years of service. AFM 39-12
2-6.d. and 2-8.b. (Sept. 1, 1966).
43. A "member" is defined in the Act to include "an enlisted member,
a warrant officer, or a commissioned officer of the armed forces." 113
CONG. REc. 8839 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (§ 941. Definitions).
44. 113 CONG. REc. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (§ 943. Restrictions
on discharges under other than honorable conditions).
45. 113 CONG. REc. 8841 (daily ed. June 26,.1967) (§ 955. Waiver of
rights by respondent).
46. E.g., the statute providing for elimination of Army warrant officers for unfitness or unsatisfactory performance, 10 U.S.C. § 1166 (1964),
is to be amended by reference to the following: "No warrant officer may
be discharged under the authority of ... section 1166 of this title for misconduct, unfitness, or security (as described in chapter 48 of this title) or
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The extent to which the proposed "provisions and procedures"
are infused into the officer elimination statutes is not without ambiguity. As noted, the Act unequivocally provides that the only
grounds for issuance of the undesirable discharge are misconduct,
unfitness, or security. The typical amendment to the officer statutes, however, permits elimination "because of moral dereliction,
professional dereliction or because his retention is not clearly consistent with the interests of national security. ....
-47 and "because
. ..the performance of his duty has fallen below standards prescribed by the Secretary [of his service] ....,"48 It is not clear,
therefore, whether the officer is subject to elimination on grounds
different from or in addition to those of misconduct, unfitness, or
security, as defined in the Act. 49

Undoubtedly the incorporated

procedures of the new chapter will eliminate the present unfair
burden of proof to "show cause" why an officer should be retained.5" If, however, Congress wishes to hold the officer to a
higher or different standard of conduct than that required of enlisted personnel, the standards for such conduct should be made
more explicit. If the intent is to hold officers and enlisted men
alike to the grounds defined in the Act, it is suggested that such
phrases as "moral or professional dereliction" are superfluous.
They can only lend further ambiguity to the already nebulous
terms "misconduct, unfitness, or security." Moreover, the retention of the discretionary phrase "standards prescribed by the Secretary" 51 detracts from the certainty and uniformity hoped to be attained under the new legislation. Despite the policy dictates to be
gleaned from the Act, it is not too much to assume that material
variances, similar to the ones noted in present regulations, will
recur in future regulations when each Secretary establishes those
"standards" appropriate to the exigencies of his department.
Numerous witnesses appearing before the Subcommittee recommended that Congress dispose of the various types of disdischarged under conditions other than honorable except pursuant to the
provisions of chapter 48 of this title." 113 CONG. REc. 8843 (daily ed.
June 26, 1967). Also, the statute providing for discharge of Naval officers
not morally qualified, 10 U.S.C. § 5864 (1964)" is to be amended by: "However, no officer may be discharged under authority of this section unless
the board proceedings conducted under section 5862 of this title were
conducted in accordance with the procedural requirements prescribed in
chapter 48 of this title." 113 CoG. Rtc. 8844 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
Quaere what is meant by "procedural" requirements.
47. See, e.g., 113 CoNG. REc. 8844 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (proposed
amendment to 10 U.S.C. § 3791 (1964) ).
48. See, e.g., 113 CoNG. REC. 8843 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (proposed
: .'
amendment to 10 U.S.C. §_3781 (1964) ).
49. See notes 73, 93, & 107 infra and accompanying text.
50. E.g., "The burden of justifying the removal for cause of any officer from the active list of the Regular Air Force shall be on the Department of the Air Force." 113 CONG. REc. 8845 (daily ed..June 26, 1967)
(proposed amendment. to 10 U.S.C. § 8793: (1964), ).
51. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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charges. 2 These proposals were not intended to decrease the right
of the military to eliminate for cause. Rather, they were offered
to decrease the adversities encountered in civilian life by recipients
of the lesser type discharges. Under a system classifying discharges by degree of honorableness, individuals receiving a general
(under honorable conditions) or undesirable (under conditions
other than honorable) certificate are subject to at least two-fold
punishment: elimination plus life-long social stigma. Unfortunately, none of the recommendations included a reasonable alternative to the present system, especially for the complex burden
which the Veterans Administration would encounter in awarding
benefits without the guidelines of a predetermined characterization
of service by the military.5"
Rather than solve this bureaucratic puzzle, Congress has retained the present Defense classification system and its ambiguous
semantics:
§ 941. Definitions.
(10) Honorable discharge means discharge from an
armed force with honor.
(11) General discharge means discharge from an
armed force under honorable conditions.
an
(12) Undesirable discharge means discharge 5 from
4
armed force under conditions other than honorable.
The key word, of course, is "honorable." But "honorable" is not
defined in the Act. Perhaps it resists definition with any degree of
specificity. Like the concept "negligence," it will remain a type of
conduct to be determined ad hoc. It is submitted, however, that
if Congress deemed it worthwhile to codify the standards for discharge, it could have used more precision than:
(1) The issuance of an honorable discharge will be
conditioned upon proper military behavior and proficient
performance of duty with due consideration for the member's age, length of service, grade, and general aptitude.
(2) The issuance of a general discharge is appropriate
when a member's military record is not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge as prescribed by
the regulations of the military department concerned. 55
These "standards" provide no guidance for the services or the
individual. Moreover, one must question the validity of the assertion that "this [Act] means that young men will not be stigmatized with the indelible mark of 'undesirable,' 'unfit,' or 'unsuitable,' unless they have had the benefit of fundamental procedural
52. See, e.g., Statement from the Subcommittee on Administrative

Discharges, the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, 1966
Hearings 121-24.
53. See 1966 Hearings 384-88.
54. 113 CONG. REc. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
55. 113 CoNG. REc. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (§ 964. Type and
character of administrative discharges; grounds for awarding).
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rights."56 The Act does attempt to delimit the grounds and fundamental procedures for awarding an undesirable discharge based,
inter alia, on the ground of unfitness. There are no such guidelines, however, for the general discharge. The only references to
this type of discharge are in the definitions noted above, and in the
provision that the general discharge may be given on the ground
of unsuitablility for "mental, physical, or psychological disabilities
described in regulations issued by the Secretary of Defense." 57
This is merely a grant of discretion to permit the same procedures
as exist under the current Defense directive. Assuming that present practices will be followed, a serviceman will be subject to the
deleterious general discharge, without a board hearing, under the
following incomplete list of circumstances:
(1) Upon the expiration of his term of service if his immediate unit commander recommends it. 5s
(2) For unsuitability, as approved by a special court-martial convening authority (e.g., a battalion commander)
on the grounds of inaptitude, character and behavior
disorders, apathy, enuresis, alcoholism, homosexual or
other
aberrant tendencies, or financial irresponsibil59
ity.

(3) For reasons of minority, disability, dependency or hardship, or convenience of the government, subject to the
discretion of the special court-martial convening authority. 60
Under these circumstances the individual receives either a general
or honorable discharge certificate. The decision is completely discretionary, based on the inconclusive phraseology that it is appropriate "when a member's military record is not sufficiently meritorious to warrant an honorable discharge."
There can be no denial of the right, duty and need of the services to eliminate individuals because of involuntary behavior, i.e.,
"unsuitability." It is also incontrovertible that many servicemen
render negative service to their country by acting just within the
law throughout their term of service. Finally, it is conceded that
most professional military officers, in a position to exercise the discretion of awarding an honorable rather than a general discharge,
would be as objective as possible. Notwithstanding these considerations, it is suggested that under the present classification system,
56. Statement of Senator Sam Ervin before Congress when introducing S,2009, Military Justice Act of 1967, 113 CONG. REC. 8838 (daily ed.

June 26, 1967).
57. 113 CoNc. RE . 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (§ 964.(b). Type
and character of administrative discharges).
58. See, e.g., AR 635-200; AFM 39-10.
59. See, e.g., Air Force Manual No. 39-12, section A (Sept. 1, 1966).
See also note 12 supra and accompanying text.
60. See, e.g., Bureau of Naval Personnel Manual, Part C, § C-10303,
"Summary of Matters Relating to Discharges of Enlisted and Inducted
Personnel."
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no compelling reason can be summoned to justify the award of a
general discharge without notice to the individual of the proscribed conduct and without a hearing or right to advice of assigned counsel comparable to that provided for the undesirable discharge."'
Since it is generally conceded "that any discharge characterized as less than honorable will result in serious injury '"62 to the
serviceman, perhaps the best alternative to the above suggestion is
to allow discharges for cause but dispose of the present system of
classification and characterization.
C. Grounds for UndesirableDischarge
The net effect on an individual of an undesirable discharge is
simple infamy. Although comparable to the criminal dishonorable
and bad conduct discharges, in that it is also awarded "under conditions other than honorable," the undesirable discharge carries no
federal conviction, no incarceration and no fine. Other effects,
although indirect, have an insidious impact: the life-long mark of
a military undesirable with the resultant closing of employment
and school doors;6 3 possible loss of all government benefits available to those with honorable or general discharge;6 4 for aliens, possible loss of naturalized citizenship; 5 and for the career-minded,
61. The question is not without debate. Arguments for classifying
dischargees: the honorable discharge is an incentive used to round out
leadership of servicemen; it is unfair to give the "honorable" and the "non-

honorable" the same class of certificate since this would taint the high
regard in which the honorable discharge is held. In light of the punitive
nature of the general discharge these arguments are without merit. Moreover, it is doubtful that the honorable discharge is a necessary or even
practical incentive, especially for the "unsuitable" person who is burdened
with involuntary physical or mental characteristics. Finally, these questions, among others, bear consideration before the present system can be
justified: without adequate standards or checks on discretion, what recourse does the borderline case have? If Congress wishes to protect the
immature serviceman, why allow board hearings and counsel only for men
with over eight years service? Does the military have sufficient interest
and right, and should it have the burden, of classifying men for the rest
of their civilian lives?
62. Bland v. Connally, 293 F.2d 852, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
63. "Thousands upon thousands of America's young men are turned
away every year by civilian, government, and State employment offices
because industry and government considers these discharged men as undesirable. They must show their discharge certificate that condemns them.
During the fiscal year of 1958, 30,748 individuals received undesirable
discharges. . . 2" Excerpt from a letter, A.F. Zerbee, Counsel for Catholic
War Veterans to Paul Woodard, Constitutional Rights Subcommittee, dated
Mar. 7, 1966, 1966 Hearings 834.
64. For a complete listing of all benefits which can accrue to a
serviceman, and the circumstances under which it is possible to forfeit
them, see GOVERNMENT TRAINnG An) 21-2-1 (1966). See also Dougherty
and Lynch, The Administrative Discharge: Military Justice?, 33 GEO.
WASH. L.R. 498, 499 n.8 (1964).
65. See 8 U.S.C. 1440(c) (1964). Cf. United States v. Sommerfeld;
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loss of present professional military status and future retirement
benefits.
Like the 195966 and 196567 Defense directives, the Act permits
the award of an undesirable discharge only for misconduct, unfitness, or security.6 8 Since obviously not common law offenses, the
distinct standards of conduct which comprise each of these military
offenses bear attention. It will be seen that the distinctions are
not always clear.
1. Misconduct
As noted, Congress was concerned that the military was taking
advantage of the administrative hearing, unencumbered by the
more stringent burden of proof6 9 and rules of evidence 70 of the
criminal Code, to punish misconduct by an undesirable discharge.
Ap early as April 1959, however, service regulations specified that
the only grounds for misconduct were: (1) conviction of certain
felonies by a civil court; (2) procurement of a fraudulent enlistment; or (3) an established prolonged absence from military control.7 1

The 1965 Defense Directive 72 and the Act 7 3 retain these

grounds for the offense of misconduct. It is important to note that
each ground could support an offense under the UCMJ punishable
74
by a dishonorable discharge and confinement of at least one year.
It seems reasonably clear, however, that the military is not bypassing the criminal Code by administratively eliminating those whose
guilt of a felony and discredit on the military is a fait accompli, or
who have perpetrated a fraud in acquiring military status, or who
211 F. Supp. 493 (E.D. Pa. 1962) (dishonorable discharge awarded by
general court-martial led to revocation of citizenship).
66. 1959 Defense Directive I VI.C.
67. 1965 Defense Directive %VI.C.
68. 113 CONG. REC. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). But cf. note 49
supra and accompanying text.
69. Like civilian criminal courts, a military court-martial must be
charged "that the accused must be presumed to be innocent until his guilt
is established by legal and competent evidence beyond reasonable doubt
* * .and that the burden of proof to establish guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt is upon the United States." Art. 51(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C.
§ 851(c) (1964). The Defense Directives do not specifically mention burden of proof although it is stated: '"The Armed Forces have the right
and the duty to separate from the service with an appropriately characterized discharge certificate members who clearly demonstrate that they are
V.A. (emphasis
unqualified for retention." 1965 Defense Directive

added).

Officer statutes typically provide that once the officer is selected

for elimination, he must show cause why he should be retained. See, e.g.,
10 U.S.C. § 3782 (1964).
70. Evidentiary rules are outlined in the MANUAL FOR COURTS MARTiL (MCM, 1951), ch. 28.
71. See, e.g., Army Reg. No. 635-206 (Apr. 8, 1959).
VII.J.
72. 1965 Defense Directive
73. 113 CONG. REC. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
74. See Arts. 83, 87, 125, 134 UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 883, 887, 925, 934
127C, § A. A court-martial would probably not
(1964) and MCM, 1951,
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have without authority left their service obligations for over a
year and may be beyond military jurisdiction. The peculiar circumstances associated with each offense render trial inadvisable.
Since under the Act the individual will be protected by numerous
safeguards concerning notice, counsel and hearing, administrative
discharge as an alternative to trial will not be unjust.
The Act has substantially tightened loose language of the
Defense directive concerning the first offense-civil conviction of
certain felonies. No longer can an administrative discharge be
based on a civil conviction for a crime involving "moral turpitude,"
regardless of sentence. 75 The Act specifies "a crime involving sexual perversion or narcotics, the penalty for which under chapter 47
[UCMJ] of this title is one year imprisonment or more; or a crime
for which a punitive discharge may be awarded by a court-martial
")76

The Act also clarifies the standard of proof necessary for the
fraudulent enlistment offense. The 1959 directive merely required a deliberate material misrepresentation or concealment
which "may" have resulted in rejection if known. 77 "May" was
changed to "might" in the 1965 directive.78 The Act establishes
certainty and increases the standard of proof by use of the more
objective word "would. ' 79 These changes are relatively minor. In
light of the manifest concern over possible evasion of the UCMJ
by administrative proceedings, however, the specificity and restrictions placed on these offenses will insure compliance with the intent of Congress.
In the third misconduct offense, Congress may have unintentionally created a loophole. The Act provides that "a discharge for
misconduct may also be given for any unauthorized absence from
jurisdiction of the Armed Forces of one year or more.'8s0 That
language would imply that the individual respondent was absent,
could not be found, and therefore could not be tried. The use of the
be convened to try the civil conviction itself, but because of concurrent
jurisdiction the military could try the convicted person for the offense
upon which the conviction was based.
75. 1965 Defense Directive
VII.J.1. The Directive does not define
moral turpitude or delimit any sentence. Current service regulations, however, define it in the same general terms as does the Act. Sexual perversion
is broadly construed "to include, but not be limited to sodomy, lesbianism,
homosexuality, sadism, voyeurism, possession of pornography, lewdness and
indecent acts with minors." Air Force Manual No. 39-12,
1-41. (Sept. 1,
1966). For a discussion of the rationale underlying this definition of moral
turpitude, and the problems encountered under previous interpretations, see
Ryker, Administrative Elimination of Airmen for Civil Conviction Within
Air Defense Command, 9 AF JAG L. Rav. (No. 4), Jul.-Aug., 1967, at 1.
76. 113 CONG. REc. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
77. 1959 Defense Directive
VII.J.2.
VII.J.2.
78. 1965 Defense Directive
79. 113 CONG. REc. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
80. Id.
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word "any," however, appears to approve the possible award of
an undesirable discharge when an accused has been previously
tried by a court-martial for such unauthorized absence, but did
not receive the authorized criminal punishment of a dishonorable
discharge. Although the individual is no less undesirable, such a
practice hints strongly of double jeopardy.
The current Defense directive attempts to establish a compromise for such situations. It provides that no discharge "under conditions other than honorable" (undesirable) may be processed and
issued administratively if a member was court-martialed for the
same offense(s) and was acquitted, except when such acquittal
"is based on a legal technicality not going to the merits."81 What
constitutes a "legal technicality" is not defined or developed in
the directive. Thus its application is conjectural and subject to
abuse,82 despite persuasive testimony by the military to the contrary.
It must be noted, however, that abuse of the "legal technicality," to administratively eliminate a member for the same offense
of which he was criminally acquitted, would be more objectionable
under present regulations which are not uniform or completely protective of the accused. The mandatory provisions of the Act provide this uniformity and protection. Since the yet to be defined 3
81. 1965 Defense Directive
V.A.7. The 1959 Defense Directive did
not contain this provision. Akin to the criminal acquittal, then administrative board, double jeopardy is that which flows from successive board

actions until a board finally arrives at the desired finding of undesirable
discharge. Like the 1965 Defense Directive ( T V.8.) the Act provides:

In any case in which an administrative discharge board recommends that the respondent be retained in the service, the case is
closed, and no new board may be appointed to consider the
case of the respondent if the evidence before the second, or subsequent, board is substantially the same as the evidence before the
previous board.
113 CONG. REC. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (emphasis added). The key
difference is that the Act adds the word "substantially"; the Directive
was broader, impliedly requiring the "same" evidence before a second board
was barred. Despite the more realistic approach under the Act, the decision from any "second" board, convened on the basis of "evidence substantially different" from the first, should be automatically reviewed by
the Court of Military Appeals to have that court legally construe what is
"substantially different" evidence.
82. Compare testimony found at 1965 Hearings 398-401 with the written statement submitted by a Washington, D.C. attorney, Robert J. Muth,
1965 Hearings 800-03. The latter describes the case of a serviceman defended by Mr. Muth in which the serviceman was given an administrative
board on the basis of the same charges and evidence which failed to

convince a general court-martial of the accused's guilt. Citing a military

letter which directed the board action despite the acquittal, Mr. Muth
wrote: "Thus in one breath it was asserted that Sergeant Johnson [the
accused] had been acquitted by a court-and that he was guilty." 1965
Hearings 802.
83. The Act provides that the Secretary of Defense must prescribe
rules of procedure and evidence, and report the rules to the Congress.
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administrative standards of proof and rules of evidence will probably be less stringent than the criminal standards under the UCMJ,
it would be less objectionable for the military to eliminate an accused in the face of a court-martial acquittal. Assuming due process before the administrative board, and assuming that a finding
by the board against the member establishes the latter's "undesirability," then such a discharge should be issued. The alternatives
are that the military must retain an individual who could be found
undesirable by an administrative board according to administrative
discharge standards; that the commander, in choosing which proceeding to initiate, must be omniscient so as to foresee that a courtmartial will acquit or its guilty verdict be overturned on the basis
of a "legal technicality," regardless of how that phrase is defined;
and that the elementary purposes of the administrative and criminal systems will be further obliterated: administrative action is
to eliminate the unwanted, while criminal action is to punish for
a crime, with elimination being only one of the punishments adjudged.
The Act does not contain the "legal technicality" phrase; on
the contrary, one provision would seem to preclude the criminaladministrative double jeopardy. 4 It is suggested, however, that
a provision comparable to the Defense Directive's "legal technicality" be included in the Act. The high standards of administrative
due process embodied elsewhere in the Act and the fact of automatic review including possible review before the Court of Military
Appeals8 5 should be recognized for what they purport to be: a
shield for the individual and not a sword by which he can escape
separation when such separation is effected according to administrative standards. Without such a provision the commander must
somehow fit the member into one of the "honorable" or "general"
discharge categories,8 6 thus further compromising and confusing
these standards, or be forced to keep the undesirable member in
active service.
Double jeopardy would also seem to be present in a situation
where the respondent was convicted by a civil trial court of one of
the proscribed felonies, was therefore administratively discharged,
and then the conviction was reversed on appeal. This situation
arose in Jackson v. United States.8 7 Jackson was convicted of
rape by a state court. While his appeal was pending, he was
awarded an undesirable discharge. On appeal the case was reversed and remanded on the ground that Jackson had been denied
his right to effective counsel when changing his plea from not
113 CONG. REC. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). It is hoped that such
rules will be promulgated similar to the extensive volume which applies
to courts-martial, MCM, 1951.
84. See note 94 infra and accompanying text.
85. 113 CONG. REC. 8843 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
86. See notes 22, 58-60 supra and accompanying text.
87. 297 F.2d 939 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
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guilty to guilty at arraignment before the trial judge.88 Subsequently, the charges were dismissed for failure of the victim to
prosecute the case.89 Jackson's undesirable discharge, however,
was a completed case and the military refused to revoke the discharge. Strictly, the discharge was based on a "conviction." The
reversal, of course, eradicates the conviction, but this is after the
fact of administrative discharge. The serviceman's remedies then
lie with the Board for Correction of Military Records, the Court of
Claims, or a federal district court, and generally for money damages
instead of reinstatement.
The military's position regarding such reversals is that they are
based on a "legal technicality," thus the discharge should issue regardless of reversal.9 0 The respondent's worth to the military has
been destroyed and in "substance" he is guilty of a heinous felony.
This view, however, is repugnant to the legal community's sense
of justice. Nevertheless, one can understand the difficulties for the
military. What is the defendant's status while on appeal? Does he
continue to draw pay and allowances? In a society where leadership is predicated on respect from below and is essential to combat
effectiveness, will the technically acquitted individual be a future
liability or asset to the military?
The Act accommodates these problems. First, no undesirable
discharge may be issued until it is affirmed on review,"' including
cases accepted for review by the Court of Military Appeals. Although the extent of the Court of Military Appeals' review authority is presently uncertain, it may possibly exercise equitable jurisdiction, thus entertaining matters tending to show "technicalities"
which might go to reversal upon the pending civil appeal. The Act
also provides that no member may be discharged on the basis of a
civil conviction if an appeal is pending unless the Judge Advocate
General writes an opinion that the appeal is frivolous or without
legal merit.9 2 These dual safeguards should insure that the individual is protected from being discharged because of a conviction
to which he has a legally sufficient defense. The administrative
problems concerning the appellant's military status, however, are
not solved in the Act to any substantial degree.
88. Jackson v. State, 316 P.2d 213 (Okla. Cir. Ct. App. 1957).
89. 1966 Hearings 396.
90. Id. See also 1959 Defense Directive I[ VII.J.1. But see 1965 Defense Directive f V.A.7, stating that "it will be the general policy to
withhold execution of the approved discharge pending outcome of an appeal." There is, therefore, no bar to convening the board to consider the
case; only the execution is abated.
91. 113 CONG. REc. 8843 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
92. It must be noted that the individual is never reinstated if the
conviction is reversed. The Act provides for him to recover all other
benefits, including a change of his discharge certificate from undesirable
to honorable or general. This is generous but goes only half way. If
the Act wishes to acknowledge a mistake, it should provide for reinstatement if the individual so desires and his record justifies it. This discretion
should be placed in the Secretary of the member's service.
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Unfitness

The second ground for the undesirable discharge does not refer
to the word misconduct, yet it is replete with objectionable conduct:
A discharge for unfitness may be given a member for one
or more of the following:
(1) Frequent involvement of a discreditable nature
with civil or armed force authorities.
(2) Sexual perversion.
(3) Drug addiction, habituation, or the unauthorized
use or possession of narcotics ... or other harmful or habitforming drugs or chemicals.
(4) An established pattern for shirking official duties
and responsibilities.
(5) An established pattern showing dishonorable failure to pay debts or to contribute adequate support to dependents ....

93

As the term implies and a reading of the offenses confirms,
the ground of unfitness is based on conduct which renders the
individual of little further value to the military. The military
undoubtedly should have recourse to punitive action against an individual whose proven conduct comes within one or more of the
above offenses. The serious question is by which tribunal, administrative board or criminal court-martial? The expressed intent
of Congress is found in the Act:
Except as provided in section 964 (c) and (d) [misconduct] or as otherwise provided by law, no member may be
administratively discharged for misconduct, unfitness, or
security by reasons of conduct which constitutes an
4 offense
punishable under chapter47 [UCMJ] of this title
Despite the broad protections afforded to the individual in admin-

istrative hearings, Congress manifestly desires to prevent the possibility of a situation such as prompted the suspicion "that the services were resorting to [administrative] means of circumventing
'
the requirements of the Code." 95
The specificity of the grounds for
misconduct and the restrictive language that "no member may be
discharged under other than honorable conditions except for misconduct, unfitness, or security. . .

.,9(

further evidence congres-

sional intent to restrict the use of administrative proceedings.
It is suggested that the ground of unfitness, as proposed, is incompatible with the restrictive policy evidenced in the Act. One
obvious inconsistency is that wrongful possession of narcotics is
an offense punishable under the UCMJ 97 and also an offense in93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

113 CONG. REC. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967)
113 CONG. REC. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967)
1960 Court of Military Appeals Report 12.
113 CONG. REC. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
Art. 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).

(emphasis added).
(emphasis added).
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dicating unfitness. Similarly, the unfitness offense of sexual perversion, as interpreted by the services, 98 is also punishable under
the UCMJ.9 9 Carefully worded specifications' 0 0 also could be
drawn to fit isolated violations of each of the other offenses. The
services maintain, however, that the unfitness ground is not for
isolated cases but for "established patterns" of discreditable conduct. 01' Hence that phrase appears in two of the five offenses
and can be implied from "frequent," "perversion," and "addiction,"
as used in the others. Assuming a fair administrative hearing is
given, no objection can be raised against elimination of those
who have exhibited a trend of obvious disregard for good order. The military is protected; but where is the statutory protection for the individual against abusive use of administrative
channels? The protection would seem to be in the quoted restriction that, except for the misconduct offenses, "no member may
be administratively discharged . . .by reasons of conduct which
constitutes an offense punishable under [the UCMJ]"102

There is an additional consideration bearing on this important
interpretation of congressional intent. While claiming they normally resort to unfitness only for "established patterns," the military asserts that some cases involving narcotics and sexual perversion are more amenable to elimination by administrative process
than by courts-martial. The reason is that courts-martial are governed by more stringent standards of proof and admissibility of evidence. Therefore, although the guilt of the individual seems clear,
a conviction and consequent elimination cannot be obtained because of peculiar "difficulties" associated with such narcotics and
sex cases. Examples of these difficulties are: lack of corpus delecti
in secretive homosexual or narcotics situations, although the member has confessed; 03 moral and social compulsion not to submit a
young victim of a sex crime to the trauma of a public trial; conflicting expert medical testimony concerning "free will," mental capacity, and the degree of moral offensiveness in certain sex offenses
such as homosexuality. 0 4 From a prosecution viewpoint these
"difficulties" are understandable. It is also recognized that the
military should be able to eliminate individuals who are guilty of
sex or narcotics crimes, especially when there is an established pattern for crimes of this nature. When the criminal elimination is
98. See note 75 supra.
99. See, e.g., Art. 125, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 925 (1964).
100. A specification is a description of the facts on the charge sheet
so as to state a specific offense under the UCMJ. See generally MCM,
1951, appendix 6.
101. See 1966 Hearings 84-85.
102. 113 CONG. REC. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
103. A confession will not support a conviction unless there is corroborating substantial independent evidence tending to establish the existence of each element of the offense(s) charged. United States v.
Young, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 211, 30 C.M.R. 211 (1961).
104. See 1966 Hearings 364-74.
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prevented by a "difficulty" in proving the conduct which constitutes the offense, then resort to the less stringent administrative
procedures might be an acceptable alternative. One must ask, however, whether such difficulties override the normal right of an
accused to be tried by a court-martial for criminal offenses punishable under the UCMJ. There is also the possibility of resort to
administrative discharge, not for a "pattern," but for a single narcotics or sex offense. Congress apparently acknowledged these
considerations by including in the Act the restrictive provision
cited above. Possible evasion, thus abuse, of the criminal elimination system has not been effectively restricted, however, by this
provision as written. The Act allows discharge for the unfitness
offenses, some of which are courts-martial offenses. At the same
time it attempts to provide that any conduct, other than that specified in the misconduct offenses, which constitutes a court-martial
crime cannot be administratively punished. The military, on the
other hand, refers to unfitness not in terms of conduct "which constitutes a court-martial offense," but in terms of difficulty in proving that conduct. Thus by its own acknowledgment, the military
might resort to discharge for unfitness when proof of the same conduct as a crime is found "difficult."
Congress apparently wishes to accede to military discretion
as to the better forum for the difficult unfitness cases. As will be
seen, individual rights receive protection under the Act comparable to a court-martial situation. These rights, cumulatively guaranteeing "administrative" due process, are a reasonable substitute
for the criminal due process under the UCMJ. Therefore Congress
declined to grant the individual the right to elect between criminal
and administrative proceedings; a right contained in the original
bills.10, As drafted, however, this Act incorporates two mutually
exclusive provisions: either misconduct is the only court-martial
ground allowed; or, unfitness offenses, although also court-martial
offenses, may be additional bases for administrative discharge under conditions other than honorable. This conflict should be resolved.
3.

Security

Of the three grounds for an undesirable discharge, security
is probably the most important from the military viewpoint. Conduct which amounts to a serious breach of national security, or
which renders an individual a security risk, cannot be condoned.
Like the Defense Directives,"' the Act sets forth a broad criterion
for this offense: "A discharge for security reasons may be given a
member when the retention of such member is not consistent with
105. S.758, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). The provisions of this bill are
the same as S.2015, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) and found in 109 CONG.
REC. 13353-68 (daily ed. Aug. 6, 1963).

106.

See 1965 Defense Directive

VII.H.
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the interests of national security. 1 07
Conduct inconsistent with the "interests of national security"
is not defined in the Act, nor is it easily defined. Fortunately,
proportionately few cases are processed on grounds of security. l08
Moreover, there seems to be little controversy over the scope of the
offense as defined in the current directive, or over the discharge
proceedings previously held by the military. 10 9
The Defense Directive refers specifically to another directive 11°
which outlines interdepartmental policy concerning administrative
elimination for security. Regulations implementing this latter directive raise interesting issues previously discussed in connection
with misconduct and unfitness. The primary purpose of such regulations is to emphasize security risks and violations of such import that they affect national security. Although any infringement
of military law and order tends to make a serviceman less reliable,
thus lessening his contribution to the country's security, the military realistically points to material conduct of a type normally
associated with violations of security. The regulation provides that
"the ultimate determination as to whether acceptance or retention
of an individual is clearly consistent with the interests of national
security is a comprehensive, common sense judgment made after
consideration of all the factors in a particular case.""' Some, although expressly 112 not all, of these factors include
commission of any act of sabotage, espionage, treason or
sedition; establishing a sympathetic association with a spy,
saboteur or espionage; advocacy of use of force or violence
to overthrow the Government; membership in, or affiliation
or sympathetic association with, any subversive group, such
as listed by the Attorney General; 1 3 and any facts which
furnish reason to believe that the individual may be subjected to coercion, influence, or pressure which may cause
him to
act contrary to the best interests of national secu14
rity.1
Certainly all these factors are of a serious nature. With the exception of the last in italics, there is also a marked degree of specificity.
Other provisions of this regulation, however, detract from the isolaation of "security" as a specific offense limitable by the restrictive
and procedural policies of the Act.
107. 113 CoNr,. REc. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
108. See generally 1966 Hearings, part 3 (appendix B).
109. Except in passing, the ground of security was not raised in. the
entire hearings.
110. 1965 Defense Directive, Reference (c), referring to DOD Directive 5210.9, Military Personnel Security Program, June 19, 1956.
111. Army Reg. No. 604-10, f 14.b. (Nov. 4,: 1959) [hereinafter referred to as AR 604-10,
-].
.

112. AR 604-10, T 14.b4

113. See, e.g., Army Regulations No. 604-45.
114. AR 604-10, T 14.b (emphasis added).
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The present regulations on security expressly allow trial by
court-martial as an alternative to administrative discharge on the
ground of security. 115 Moreover, administrative proceedings are
permitted where "national security is the primary consideration
and action under other . . .regulations or the Uniform Code of

Military Justice has been determined to be inappropriate or has
proven unsuccessful."1 " Certain of the "factors" noted above constitute violations of specific punitive articles under the UCMJ.I"
Contempt toward officials,1 s sedition, 119 the "in time of war" offenses of aiding the enemy120 and spying,121 and the "factors"
incorporated into the general article 134122 would be comparable
offenses punishable under the UCMJ. Hence, the security ground
tends to overlap the court-martial field
and specific cases could
2
violate the restrictive policy of the Act.'

1

Some circumstances which might constitute a security case
tend to make the ground of security also indistinguishable from the
grounds of unfitness and misconduct. Although the emphasis is
always on national security, notoriously disgraceful conduct, drug
addiction, sexual perversion, and behavior which tends to show that
the member is not reliable or trustworthy are presently included
as conduct which might render one a security risk, thus liable for
administrative elimination. 2 4 Were it not for the condition precedent that the case must affect the "interests of national security,"
the broad purview of security would be susceptible to attack. Caveat, however; "national security" lacks precise definition. Lack
of controversy does not mean lack of possible abuse. Adding an
allegation of security risk to difficult-to-prove cases of narcotics
or sexual perversion (e.g., homosexuality) would seem to be a sure
method of insuring discharge and quieting dispute.
One protective provision of the Act is especially pertinent to
the subject of security. When the military deletes on security
grounds any matter from an investigation report offered in evidence, the matter may not be shown to the board if it is denied to
the individual; and if the deleted matter substantially lessens the
evidentiary value of the report, then the entire report must be
excluded. 2 5 This provision protects a respondent from being discharged on the basis of classified material to which he has no
access for rebuttal. The inclusion of such a provision demonstrates
115. AR 604-10,

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

1.

AR 604-10,
14.c (emphasis added).
See also the "offenses" listed in AR 604-10,
Art. 88, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 888 (1964).
Art. 94, UCMJi 10 U.S.C. § 894 (1964).
Art. 104, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 904 (1964).
Art. 106, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 906 (1964).
Art. 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (1964).
See note 94 supra and accompanying text.
AR 604-10,
14.C.(1)-(5).
113 CONG. REC. 8841 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).

14.C.(1)-(5).
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the fairness which Congress has attempted to insert into the administrative discharge proceedings.
D. Protectionof Individual Rights
The rights which should be accorded an individual facing an
administrative adjudicative proceeding are of no less importance
than those which accrue in the criminal forum. Recent Supreme

Court 1 2 and Court of Military Appeals 127 cases reflect the expand-

ing recognition of "basic" rights which must be afforded the criminally accused during various stages of prosecution. The difficult
and ultimate question, however, is what constitutes the total of
an individual's rights in ajudicatory processes. Congress has attempted to answer that question by codifying the "administrative
due process" applicable to elimination boards. The task is not easy
because this administrative code must apply to all possible situations. When considered in light of the "cut and dried" case, a long
list of rights guaranteed by a code may seem superfluous. In the
complex case, however, the same rights will insure the individual
a fair hearing.
The military readily admits that its administrative board proceedings are fact-finding, therefore adjudicatory. 1 28 Elimination
proceedings are for cause, but they are not of an adversary nature.129 As seen, the grounds are at times indistinguishable from
criminal offenses, yet the limits are nebulously prescribed. Although a respondent could be a highly educated officer, an experienced noncommissioned officer, or the youngest recruit, any statutory code prescribing protective procedures must focus on the
ignorant and inexperienced. With some technical exceptions, the
Act has resolved all doubt in favor of the latter type individual:
In some areas the Act incorporates enlightened practices already in effect pursuant to the 1959 and 1965 Defense Directives.
In others, the Act makes mandatory those procedures which the
126. See, e.g., the two prominent "right to counsel" cases, Miranda

v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
127. E.g., United States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249
(1967) (extending Miranda to the military). But see Culp v. United
States, 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963) (accused at special courtsmartial not entitled to lawyer-counsel as a matter of right).
128. See, e.g., 1965 Defense Directive
IX.B.; Air Force Manual No.
39-12,
3-1 (Sept. 1, 1966). Calling such boards "administrative and not

judicial" does not disguise the true nature of making a decision based on
facts which will affect the respondent's property rights. The "administrative-not-judicial" theory is further weakened by the generally accepted
rule in the military that the convening authority cannot on his own change
the board's finding to one more severe. See 1965 Defense Directive 1 IX.D.
For a complete discussion of this issue, see 1 DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
§ 7 (1958).
129. Evidence for the Government, compilation of a record, and other
administrative details are performed by a "recorder" who is generally
not a lawyer. The recorder has no vote on the findings.
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military now exercises on a policy, practical, or discretionary basis.
It is therefore of interest to note the evolution of individual rights
before such boards.
The 1959 Defense directive granted the ultimate in discretion
to the military services and provided only vaguely for the individual. The services only had to "properly advise" the individual of
the basis of contemplated administrative action and to afford him
the opportunity to request or waive in writing the following "privileges": to have his case heard by a board of officers; to appear in
person before the board; to be represented by counsel, who, if reasonably available should be a lawyer; and to submit statements in
his own behalf. 130 As a point of reference, this directive compares
favorably and closely with the Administrative Procedure Act. 181
In general, the services translated the "privileges" into "rights"
and attempted to cover all contingencies to further protect the
individual. For example:
An enlisted person appearing before a board of officers is
entitled to be present at all hearings, to be confronted with
the witnesses against him to the maximum extent practicable and to military counsel of his own selection, if reasonably available. He may be represented by civilian counsel at his own expense. If counsel of his own choosing is not
available, counsel will be furnished by the convening authority. Counsel furnished should be a lawyer, if reasonably
available. If not a lawyer, the counsel will be an experienced officer of mature judgment who is fully aware of his
to prepare and present the respondent's
responsibility
32
case.1

The concept of specific individual rights was incorporated into
the 1965 Defense directive, and some major variances which had
previously existed among the services were made uniform. Additional rights were recognized and provided: counsel before
13 5
and submission of rewaiver, 33 challenge, 34 self-incrimination,
1 6
evidence.
own
spondent's
VIII.D.
130. 1959 Defense Directive
131. See generally Administrative Procedure Act §§ 4-7, 5 U.S.C. §§
1004-07 (1964). This Act is either inapplicable expressly (e.g., section 4
excepts any military or naval function) or by construction (see JAGA
1961/4945) to internal military administrative proceedings. Moreover,
because of the disproportionate investigative power residing in the military as compared to the individual, compulsory military service, and the
general youth of respondents before military boards, the provisions of the
Administrative Procedure Act would be practically inappropriate.
ll.b.(3) (Apr. 8, 1959). It is interesting to note
132. AR 635-208,
that "experienced" has been defined to mean "at least one year of active
1-4.b. (Sept. 1, 1966). One year
duty in any capacity." AFM 39-12,
can hardly be equated to "experienced."
VIII.D.L.(c).
133. 1965 Defense Directive
IX.C.2.
134. 1965 Defense Directive
IX.C.5.
135. 1965 Defense Directive
IX.C.4.
136. 1965 Defense Directive
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A superficial examination of this current directive reveals a
system seemingly replete with protections for the individual. From
the individual's view, however, the greatest deficiency is that he is
subject to many discretionary actions by the authority convening
the board. Counsel is intended to have legal qualifications-a
Judge Advocate-unless the record certifies that one is unavailable,
the reasons for the unavailability, and states the qualifications of
the substituted non-lawyer counsel. 13 Although this places pressure on the convening authority to provide counsel with legal qualifications, failure to do so because of practical exigencies or even a
desire to deny such counsel could easily be justified. Another
disadvantage under the 1965 directive is that the discharge authority need not compel the attendance of witnesses for or against the
respondent. The denial of confrontation with prosecution witnesses leaves the individual with the alternative of cross-examining
a piece of paper. To rebut the evidence against him, the individual
can request the appearance of his own or adverse witnesses. Upon
receipt of this request "the board will invite the witnesses to attend
if it considers that the witness is reasonably available and that his
testimony can add materially to the case. If a witness on active
duty declines the invitation, the board may refer the matter to the
convening authority for a decision or orders. However, witnesses
not on active duty must appear voluntarily and at no expense to
the Government."' 38 Even if the convening authority desires the
appearance of witnesses not under his control he has no subpoena
authority similar to that under the UCMJ. 13. The disadvantages
are obvious in this system, under which the respondent is subject to
the discretion of a board-convening authority-witness hierarchy.
The Act would do away with most of the objections found in the
Defense directive. Counsel shall be assigned and shall be a lawyer
qualified in the same sense as one who represents an accused at
criminal trials. 140 Consequently, all military personnel liable to receive a punitive-type discharge shall- have equal rights to the
assistance of legally qualified counsel. This absolute right is perhaps the strongest safeguard afforded by the Act. Regardless of
the maturity and intelligence of a non-lawyer assigned to assist
respondent at an administrative hearing, which by definition has
more relaxed rules of evidence and procedure, -the non-lawyer
cannot be expected to conduct the defense of his "client" as thoroughly as the advocate trained in the law and guided by the lawyer's ethical canons.
137. 1965 Defense Directive
IX.K. See also Army Regs.. No. 15-6, 8
(Aug. 12, 1966) which provides in part: "Unless the 'specific statute or
regulation under which the investigating officer or board of %officers is
appointed so provides, an individual under investigation is not entitled as a

matter of right to appointed counsel who is legally qualified."
138.
139.
140.

1965 Defense Directive
IX.C.3.
Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1964).
113 CONG. REc. 8838 (daily ed. June 26,1967).
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The proposed Act is deficient concerning the critical time when
the individual is placed in contact with a specific lawyer-his
lawyer-as compared to the time when he is informed of his right
to counsel. Written notification of the pending board action must
must be given the respondent at least fifteen days before the board
is authorized to meet.' 4 ' Such notice must contain all information
necessary to begin preparation of a defense, including advice that
there is an absolute right to counsel. Missing from the required
contents of the notice, however, is the name of the assigned counsel.
Since counsel must be assigned at some time, unspecified in the
Act, it would seem desirable that the name of that counsel be a
required item of the written notice. This would guarantee the
respondent immediate access to his own counsel for advice. The
respondent also would have the benefit of a full fifteen day period
in which to intelligently consider whether to waive the board
hearing 142 or to press a defense to the pending action.
The Act takes a realistic approach to the role played by counsel
in defense of respondents to administrative discharge actions.
From the convening authority's view, however, some procedures
outlined in the Act relating to counsel may tend to impede the
efficiency of the discharge system. It will undoubtedly require
the hindsight of experience to ascertain whether the protective
features of the Act outweigh any operational disadvantages, Several examples can be cited to demonstrate how the proposed legislation protects the individual by prescribing detailed procedures
involving the individual's counsel.
Not only is counsel assigned to each respondent but he must
143
co-sign any waiver of counsel's services or of the board hearing.
This forces the respondent to at least consult with his assigned
counsel before waiving the protections guaranteed to be available
under the Act. Because the respondent cannot exercise a waiver
within twenty-four hours after receipt of -notice of the proposed
board hearing, 44 this also prevents the convening authority from
rushing the issuance of a discharge based on an improvident waiver.
A second requirement is that copies of any papers given to the
respondent must also be delivered to respondent's counsel. 145 This
insures that counsel will have notice of all important documents
required by other provisions to be served on the serviceman. Two
other advantages accrue from this mandate. One is that individually hired civilian counsel, 41 who might be unaware of military
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at

8841.
8840.
8841.
8840.

146. In accord with the general rule that a serviceman always has
the right to obtain the services of his own civilian attorney, at his own
expense, the Act provides this option for respondents. See 113 CoNo. REc.
8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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paperwork or would have more difficulty obtaining such paperwork than military counsel, is not denied access to all matters
material to respondent's case. Also, counsel will not be hindered
in preparing the defense of his client because the client misplaced
an important document simply because he failed to appreciate its
importance to his defense.
A third example of protection for the respondent in an area
involving his counsel is found in the requirement that notice by
registered mail shall be sent to the parents or next of kin of the
respondent-permissively if he is over twenty-one years, compulsorily if under twenty-one. 14
It is interesting to note that no
such notice is required in courts-martial actions, the responsibility
there evidently being on counsel to notify and seek out an accused's
next of kin for whatever practical or psychological advantage might
be obtained for the client.
The notice provision last discussed and the two examples noted
above demonstrate the aura of parens patriae which the Act would
bring to the administrative discharge setting. Congress apparently
envisions that the common case would involve an immature respondent who might be unaware of his rights, or afraid to assert
them, or even willing to forego the benefit of assigned counsel and
a board hearing. 14 s Hence, the Act makes certain that before a
less than honorable discharge can be effected all respondents have
the benefit of at least preliminary advice from an informed counsel.
That legally qualified counsel would be given a more active
role is certainly one of the better features of the proposed legislation. Besides shielding the respondent from command influence,
groundless charges, and rash acquiescence to the sometimes attractive "easy out" via administrative discharge, the required intervention of counsel will raise at least two new questions. Both
issues parallel situations which commonly arise under the criminal
justice system. The first concerns a possible question of due process. Because the many rights, detailed procedures, times and
notices would be mandatory under the Act, and because the respondent would have a new right to appeal to the highest military
14
it
court before any undesirable discharge could be executed,
seems certain that allegations of lack of due process will be pressed
on that court if one or more of the required procedures are not observed by the convening authority. The underlying issue on such
appeals will be whether the failure to comply has been prejudicial
147. 113 CONG. REC. 8840 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). No time is specified in the Act as to when this notice must be sent. It is suggested
that the convening authority be obligated, or advised, to send the notice
to the next of kin at the same time that he sends notice to the respondent.
Assuming Congress desires the next of kin to have an influence on the
respondent, this would not be fulfilled by a belated notice sent to the
next of kin.
148. 1966 Hearings 180.
149. 113 CONG. REc. 8841 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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to a substantial right of the respondent. The second situation
which should commonly occur with the guarantee of legally qualified counsel involves "negotiated pleas." Such negotiations frequently take place in the criminal setting. 15 0 They involve the
exacting of a maximum sentence which the convening authority
will approve on review for the "consideration" that the accused
plead guilty. There is an apt analogy to the administrative discharge system. For the "consideration" of the respondent waiving
the board hearing-thus saving the Government time, expense and
the burden of proof-counsel may be able to "negotiate" a discharge
certificate of a higher type than undesirable. In either of these
two situations, the interests of the respondent would be much better protected with guaranteed lawyer-counsel as compared with the
present system under which counsel "should be" legally trained.
Unlike the criminal defendant, who is usually aware even before arrest of the essentials of the charge against him, the respondent is typically caught unaware when his commander confronts
him with a prima facie case and notice that a board proceeding and
possible elimination have been recommended. 51 Without authority to confront accusing witnesses, to obtain witnesses in mitigation,
or to compel production of all evidence pertinent to the case, the
respondent and the board must rely on the evidence in the case
file. Several recent federal cases have criticized the unfair hearing which results from a board's reliance on ex parte statements
and denial of confrontation.15 2 The Act fills the void by granting
boards 1 53a subpoena power similar to that which exists under the
UCMJ

and in the federal courts.1 54

The Act also answers the

criticism of the federal courts by securing rights which will improve the fairness of the hearing: the right of respondent to be
informed of all evidence against him; 55 the right to cross-examine
150. For a general discussion of this subject, and the tactics involved,
see Murphy, The Army Defense Counsel: Unusual Ethics for an Unusual
Advocate, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 233 (1961). Notably, the Army and Navy use
"negotiated pleas" whereas the Air Force prohibits their use as a matter
of policy. 1966 Hearings 73.
151. The obvious exceptions are the " misconduct" offenses of civil
conviction, absence without authority, and fraudulent enlistment. These
offenses include facts well known to the prospective respondent. The
unfitness, security, and unsuitability cases, however, are more likely to be
investigated and prepared by the unit commander before the respondent is
aware that he is being recommended for a board action. Since most
boards must be convened above the level of the respondent's unit commander, the respondent generally does have notice of the pending action
before the higher convening authority officially approves the -board action.
For a complete description of these procedures see, e.g., AFM 39-12 (Sept.
1,,1966).
152. E.g., Gamage v. Zuckert, Civil No. 1124-64 (D.D.C. 1965). Martinez v. Collins, No. 3321 (W.D. Wash. 1965)., Neal v. United States, No.
226-62, Report of Commissioner <Ct.-Cl. Jan 20, 1966).
153. Art. 46, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 846 (1964).
154. FED. R. CaRM. P. 17.
155. 113 CONG. REC. 8842 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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investigators of all reports and to receive such reports in advance
of the hearing; 5" the right to cross-examine all other witnesses
from whom adverse information has been elicited and offered as
evidence; 157 and as noted previously, the right to have equal access
to or corresponding denial of classified material relevant to the
case.158
While it is not contended that a respondent should be denied
one of the protective measures provided by the Act, several unwanted effects may result from passage of this legislation. The
military is well aware of the serious consequences attaching to
elimination proceedings. They are equally aware of the need to
provide a fair elimination procedure, as a close reading of current
departmental regulations will confirm1 59 These regulations have
always attempted to reach a compromise between the need to eliminate for cause and the need to safeguard individual rights during
the process. Unfortunately, the regulations viewed as a group are
susceptible to criticism as being non-uniform, emphasizing military
over individual needs, and containing excessive grants of discretion.
What cannot be attacked is the need to eliminate personnel who
are unfit and unwilling to serve their country in peacetime and
who are unpredictable hazards to their unit in combat. It is possible, then, that a complex administrative discharge system will
become so enmeshed with technical administration that justice is
not accorded the innocent or the guilty. Additionally, a host of new
legal counsel will be needed for assignment to respondents before,
at, and after board hearings. Another factor is that a convening
authority with responsibility for disciplining an individual accused
of serious misconduct, and faced with choosing between equally
complex administrative and criminal systems, may well select the
criminal with the resulting federal conviction, confinement, reduction in grade, and fine being added to the punitive discharge. 160
Of course, the ultimate question is whether the administrative
156. Id. at 8841.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See, e.g., AFM 39-12 (Sept. 1, 1966); AR 635-212 (July 15, 1966).
160. The corollary to this possibility was outlined by Major General
(then Brig. Gen.) Hodson, present Judge Advocate General of the Army,
when commenting on the effect of a too rigid administrative discharge
system:
I am suggesting that if you tighten up administrative discharge
procedures, so that they become almost unworkable except to give
a man an honorable discharge, commanders might try a man by
summary court for failing to report to the properly appointed place
of duty, and 1 week later try him by summary court for going
from the properly appointed place of duty, and 2 weeks later
recommend trial by special court for failing to report to the properly appointed place of duty, in which case you could invoke paragraph 127(c) [MCM, 1951, authorizing a court to adjudge a bad
conduct discharge on the basis of two prior convictions within one
year although the present offense is not so punishable] and the
court could conceivably give him a bad conduct discharge.
1966 Hearings 373.
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discharge procedures will prove too burdensome to an establishment the main mission of which is to protect the country at all
costs and to accommodate the individual so long as the main mission is not jeopardized.
The above are only possibilities. The Act, on the other hand,
provides certainty for the individual. It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that the military, noted for its flexibility, would
be able to make the same adjustment to the requirements of the
proposed administrative code as it did to the equally protective and
stringent requirements of the criminal code. This adjustment
would have to be made in the name of justice and with a sense of
pride that the serviceman is not a "second-class citizen."' 6 1 Congress, however, should endeavor to remove the heretofore mentioned ambiguities in the proposed Act, especially by specifically
defining the proscribed conduct.
III.

CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM

The changes proposed in Titles III and IV concerning the
criminal justice system are not as sweeping in scope as those intended for the administrative justice system. Primarily, the
changes in these titles are intended to align the rights of military
defendants and the structure of military courts with those found in
the federal district court system. 162 To accomplish these ends the
Act incorporates greater independence, status and authority for the
military trial and review judges, and a more extensive participation
by the military lawyer. The following discussion will highlight the
controversial areas with an analysis of their impact on the Armed
Forces.
A.

Right to Counsel

Under present law the military accused is entitled to assigned
legally trained counsel only at the "general" court-martial' 2
(hereinafter GCM).
At the "special" court-martial (SPCM)
161. This term, and its converse of "first-class citizen," has gained recent popularity when referring to the rights of servicemen as compared
with those enjoyed by the "first-class" civilian citizens. See, e.g., remarks
attributed to President Lyndon Johnson, 111 CONG. REC. 4324 (daily ed.
Jan. 26, 1965).
162. The analogy is apt. Courts-martial are a form of federal court
created by statute. The MCM, 1951,
137, expressly provides one correlation to the federal system: "So far as not otherwise prescribed in this
manual, the rules of evidence generally recognized in the trial of criminal
cases in the United States district courts...." Although the UCMJ is
silent as to which law is otherwise applicable, the Court of Military Ap-

peals has said: "We have repeatedly held that Federal practice applies to
courts-martial procedures if not incompatible with military law. ...
."
United States v. Knudson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 587, 590, 16 C.M.R. 161, 164 (1954).
163. Art. 27(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 827(b) (1964). The general courtmartial has the broadest jurisdiction of all military courts, can adjudge
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level he must have counsel, but the Uniform Code of Military
Justice (UCMJ) does not require formal legal training. 6 4 Although a defendant before either of these courts can retain civilian counsel, much controversy has arisen concerning this lack
of assigned lawyer-counsel before the SPCM, which can impose a
sentence of six months confinement and a bad conduct discharge. 1 5
In Culp v. United States, 6 lack of lawyer-counsel was
raised as a constitutional question: pursuant to the sixth amendment 1 67 guarantee of the right to counsel, must counsel assigned
to accused at SPCM be legally trained? The Court of Military
Appeals answered in the negative, thus upholding the present practice. Two separate concurring opinions of the three judge court indicated disagreement on the specific rationale for denying military
personnel this important right. The opinion of the court was that
an accused in the military is not entitled to counsel as a matter of
right under the sixth amendment, therefore defense counsel appointed by the court need not be a lawyer. 168 The concurring
judges disagreed inter se on the application of the sixth amendment to courts-martial, but agreed with the result. Chief Judge
Quinn was of the opinion that the appointment of a commissioned
officer satisfied the constitutional requirement for "assistance of
counsel."' 169 Judge Ferguson also indicated that the amendment
applied to the military, but said that Culp had waived the constitutional issue since he had accepted the non-lawyer defense counsel
appointed for him. 170 If non-lawyer counsel are adequate assistance for an accused in the military, then the only reason for
changing this arrangement would be their inadequacy. This was
the central issue in Application of Stapley.' 7 There the military
accused sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court
after conviction by a SPCM, alleging lack of due process because
his assigned counsel had been a non-lawyer and demonstrably inany penalty up to death depending on the maximum authorized for a
particular offense, and has requirements for a minimum of 5 members, a
law officer, and verbatim record.
164. Art. 27(c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. 827(c) (1964). The special courtmartial is the "middle" court between the general and one-man summary
courts-martial.
165. The jurisdictional punishment limit for a SPCM, modified by the
maximum authorized for the particular offense: bad conduct discharge
(if a verbatim record is kept), six months confinement at hard labor, three
months hard labor without confinement, forfeiture of two-thirds pay per
month for six months, and reduction to the lowest enlisted grade. Art. 19,
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 819 (1964).
166. 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
167. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI, which provides in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance
of Counsel for his defense."
168. 14 U.S.C.M.A. at 216, 33 C.M.R. at 428.
169. Id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429 (concurring opinion).
170. Id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431 (concurring opinion).
171. 246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
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adequate. The court granted the writ, holding the SPCM to be
without jurisdiction because "minimal requirements of due process
and the Sixth Amendment are not satisfied by the assignment as
counsel to an accused of officers with substantially no experience,
training 2or knowledge in the field of law, either military or civilian."1"
Under the proposed legislation Congress seeks to resolve the
constitutional and practical issues resulting from non-lawyers being
assigned to SPCM. The Act would change the UCMJ to read:
"Trial counsel or defense counsel detailed for a general courtmartial or special court-martialmust . . . ,,17be legally qualified.
This amendment would bring the military in line with the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which require legal counsel to be assigned to defendants unable to procure their own.1 7 4 Although
perhaps not the typical accused, a private first-class earning $99.37
basic pay per month should qualify as "indigent" and not be obligated to obtain civilian counsel at his own expense.
The exact impact on the military is difficult to foresee. The Air
Force claims it presently assigns legally trained counsel to both
prosecution and defense in all SPCM. 1 75

Naval statistics indicate

the use of counsel with legal qualifications in approximately
forty-two per cent of the cases. 176 The Army, however, favors the
use of qualified counsel only when a bad conduct discharge can be
awarded. 177 As a practical matter, present Army regulations forbid the transcription of a verbatim record at SPCM, thereby precluding the use of that court for adjudging a bad conduct discharge.1 78 With lawyer-counsel required for all SPCM under the
Act it is difficult to predict whether the Army will change its present policy. What can be expected for all services is a severe burden
on present legal personnel. The SPCM is currently the most frequently used trial court. 79 Because the Act also provides that an
172. Id. at 321 (emphasis added). The court did limit its holding to
the facts of the case. Id. at 320. Other district courts have recently affirmed the present non-lawyer system. See, e.g., LeBallister v. Warden,
247 F. Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1966).
173. 113 CONG. REc. 8847 (daily ed. June 16, 1967).
174. FED.R. Canviu.P. 44.
175. 1966 Hearings 40.
176. Id. at 1019. The Navy representatives also testified that it utilizes
the services of a law officer at complicated special courts-martial. Id. at 40.
While this is commendable, it is submitted that a good lawyer defense
counsel could make even the simplest court-martial complicated for a
non-lawyer president of a special court-martial. Since the present UCMJ
permits a non-lawyer to preside at special courts-martial, Art. 51(b),
UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(b) (1964), one further disadvantage flowing from
the proposed change in the Act to have both counsel be attorneys is that
their conduct of the trial will raise issues which the average untrained
president of the court will be unable to adjudicate.
177. 1966 Hearings 89.
178. Army Reg. No. 22-145 (1964).
179. In fiscal year 1965 the military convened approximately 40,826
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accused cannot be tried by a "summary" court-martial s0 (SCM)
over his objection,181 the number of SPCM will undoubtedly increase. It seems reasonable, however, that the military would welcome the increased protection for the accused if a comparable increase in the number of Judge Advocates was also authorized.
Although outside the scope of the Act, Congress should take affirmative concomitant measures to insure that additional allocations
for military lawyers are made available. Making legally trained
counsel mandatory is only half a solution. The other half is having sufficient attorneys available to satisfy the needs of accused
and to insure against the military being unable to prosecute because
they lack enough attorneys.
B.

Military Judges

The UCMJ requires that a specially certified and legally trained
officer will preside at the highest level military court, the GCM.
Under the Code he is termed a "law officer.' 1 82 His specific duties
are to charge the court, and to rule with finality on interlocutory
questions other than challenges, motions for a finding of not quilty,
and capacity to stand trial. 83 In practice, the law officer has
been accorded more latitude and respect in overseeing the GCM
than is apparent from a reading of the military criminal Code. The
SPCM. See 1966 Hearings 912, 1018, 1053. Prior to the expanded authority
and increased punishment power in commanders to impose nonjudicial
punishment, the summary court-martial was more extensively used by
the military. See Art. 15, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 815 (1964). The intent is to
phase out the controversial one-officer summary court. 113 CONG. REC.
8839 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
180. The summary court-martial is composed of one commissioned officer who acts in the capacity of trial counsel, defense counsel, judge and
jury. This court may try only enlisted men. Maximum jurisdictional
punishment is: confinement at hard labor for one month, restriction to
specified limits for more than two months, and forfeiture of two-thirds of
one month's pay. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964). See MCM, 1951,
20.b. regarding reduction in grade. There is no authorization in the
UCMJ for a right to independent counsel.
181. 113 CONG. REC. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). At present, a
serviceman may object to trial by a SCM only if he has not been offered
nonjudicial punishment. Therefore, if he has been offered nonjudicial
punishment and has elected to refuse it, he may be tried by a SCM regardless of his objection. Art. 20, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 820 (1964). The proposed
change would permit a serviceman to object to trial by SCM in any situation. Thus, assuming he wishes to risk the increased punishment jurisdiction of the SPCM, the accused has unalterable access to a lawyercounsel, as proposed in the Act.
182. Arts. 1(11), 26(a), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801(11), 826(a) (1964).
183. Art. 51(b), (c), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(b), (c) (1964). For a
more complete discussion of the law officer's duties, see Department of
the Army Pamphlet No. 27-9, "The Law Officer" (1958). See also Meagher
& Mummey, Judges in Uniform: An Independent Judiciary for the Army,
44 J. Am.JuD. Soc'Y 46 (1960); Weiner, The Army's Field Judiciary System:
A Notable Advance, 46 A.B.A.J. 1178 (1960).
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Court of Military Appeals has stated that the law officer, "like
the judge, is the final arbiter at the trial level as to questions of
law. He is the court-martial's advisor and director in affairs hav1 4
ing to do with legal rules or standards and their application."'
Although the status of the law officer as a "federal judge" has been
questioned,8 5 Congress intends to resolve any doubt by renaming
the law officer a "Military Judge."'8 6 In consonance with recognition as a true trial judge, he has been given greater independence
and responsibilities.
Current law provides for the law officer to be detailed by the
officer convening the GCM.18 7 This practice is strictly followed
only in the Air Force. 88 The other services have established a
"field judiciary" system under which the law officer is assigned
from a chain-of-command originating in the office of the Judge
184.
(1952).

United States v. Berry, 1 U.S.C.M.A. 235, 240, 2 C.M.R. 141, 146
Cf. United States v. Biesak, 3 U.S.C.M.A. 714, 14 C.M.R. 132 (1954).

185.

See Miller, Who Made The Law Officer A "Federal Judge"?,

4 Mm. L. REv. 39 (1959).
186. 113 CONG. REc. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).

The Act would

realistically grant additional power in the "military judge" by authorizing
him to conduct pretrial and "in chambers" hearings to pass on the legality
of all relevant motions, defenses, objections and "any other procedural
function which .

.

. does not require the presence of the members of the

court." Id. At least two difficulties will arise as a result of these new
powers as drafted. First, the Act would allow the military judge to hold
the arraignment and receive the pleas of the accused if permitted by regulations of the Secretary concerned. Because the Air Force alone presently
requires the trial counsel (prosecutor) to establish a prima facie case,
although the accused has pleaded guilty, there will undoubtedly be lack of
uniformity among the services. 1966 Hearings 62. While uniformity of
itself is not a cherished goal, close analysis of the effect of different
procedures in conducting the pretrial arraignment reveals that an accused
in one service can receive protection substantially greater than an accused
in the other services. Perhaps the better solution is to adopt the more
protective procedures in the Manual for Courts-Martial. The second
difficulty involves statutory construction. The proposed amendment to
Article 51 (b), while granting authority in the judge, or in his absence, the
President, to rule with finality on all interlocutory questions, further provides: "Any such ruling made by the military judge upon any question of
law or any interlocutory question other than the mental responsibility of
the accused, or by the president . . . other than a motion for a finding of
not guilty, is final and constitutes the rulings of the court." 113 CONG.
REC. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (emphasis added). The technical question raised is whether this disjunctive phraseology would possibly be giving
authority in the president but not the judge to rule with finality (or at all)
on the mental responsibility of the accused. Because the converse would
be a reasonable construction, i.e., that the judge but not the president should
be allowed to rule on a motion of not guilty, then the above-mentioned
possibility gains added weight. This is so although the most "reasonable"
construction is that only the full court, where not preempted by the accused's election, should pass with finality on mental responsibility. Thus,
this amendment should be rewritten to remove the inherent difficulty
posed above.
187. Art. 26, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 826 (1964).
188. 1966 Hearings 52.
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Advocate General. 8 9 This system provides the law officer with an
atmosphere of complete impartiality for the trial and complete independence from the commander convening the court. The advantages of this system are obvious. "One of the most significant
developments of the last 10 years in military justice was the institution by the Army and the Navy of their law officer programs
[field judiciary] . . . No other single factor has served to reduce trial errors and improve courts-martial practice than this
simple but effective plan."'190 Despite objection by the Air Force
that the field judiciary system is not suitable for their present requirements and isolated global dispositions, 19 ' the Act would make
the independent system mandatory for all services.' 92 In a society
in which all personnel are responsive to the inclinations of the commander, it seems most appropriate that trial judges be placed in a
position from which they can objectively survey a command, its
courts, and the accused.
Congress also intends a new role for the law officer/military
judge. Like the federal system, in which the defendant can waive
trial by jury with the approval of the court and consent of the
government, 19 the Act would provide the same option for the military accused.19 4 This election would apply to all GCM, but only
to those SPCM to which the military judge has been detailed in
advance on request of the convening authority. A separate proposal would require that an accused may not be tried by a SPCM
without a military judge if a bad conduct discharge may be adjudged as punishment for the offense. 195 Thus, the convening authority will have to request a military judge if the offense charged
is punishable by a bad conduct discharge and the convening au189. See, e.g., Army Reg. No. 27-135 (1963).
190. Statement of Judge Homer Ferguson, U.S. Court of Military Appeals, 1966 Hearings299.
191. 1966 Hearings 52-53.
192. 113 CONG. REC. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
193. FED. R. CRiM. P. 23.
194. 113 CONG. REC. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
195. Id. It is interesting to note that this section of the proposed Act
also requires that before a bad conduct discharge may be adjudged, a verbatim record must be made, and the accused represented by lawyercounsel except in time of war. This is in direct conflict with a previously
noted proposed change to Article 27, UCMJ; that is, counsel assigned to
special courts-martial will be legally trained. See note 193 supra and
accompanying text. There seems to be no rational reason to include the
"in time of war" stipulation if the right to qualified counsel is already accorded to the accused. If Congress wishes to make an exception for wartime situations it must likewise amend the Article 27(b) assignment of
legal counsel to permit deviations from that mandate in time of war.
This latter amendment, however, would seem to negate the legislative
desire that the serviceman be protected in both war and peacetime. "We
cannot wait as we did a generation ago, until all these men return to
civilian life with their stories of injustice." 113 CONG. REC. 8838 (daily
ed. June 26, 1967).
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In the

case of either the GCM, to which a military judge must be detailed,
or the SPCM, to which a military judge may be detailed, the accused can overcome any alleged prejudice he might receive from
a court of "line" officers by requesting a court composed only of
the military judge.
Notably the military option to be tried by a judge alone provides more freedom of choice for the accused than its civilian
courterpart as found in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Under rule 23 the civilian defendant may waive trial by jury
"with approval by the court and consent of the government.' ' 197
The military accused, however, needs such approval only if his
written request for a single officer court is made less than twentyfour hours prior to the time the court is assembled. At any time
before the above limitation, and having consulted with counsel, the
accused alone has the prerogative to decide the composition of the
court, assuming it is a GCM or the special form of SPCM. 198 This
option effectively precludes any possible claim that the convening
authority is "stacking" the court with officers who are predisposed
to convictions or acceding to the influence of the commander. Al196. It is possible that such determination by the convening authority is irrelevant to the question of whether a military judge must be
detailed to the court if the offense of which the accused is charged carries a maximum punishment, to include the bad conduct discharge, as prescribed in the Table of Maximum Punishments, MCM, 1951,
127(c), Section A. The proposed amendment to Article 19, UCMJ, is couched in
mandatory language: "No person shall be tried by a special court-martial
without a military judge if a bad conduct discharge may be adjudged as
punishment for the offense with which such person is charged." 113 CONG.
REc. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967) (emphasis added). It is noted, however,
that no direct reference is made to the Table of Maximum Punishments;
that a proposed change to Article 16, UCMJ, describing the types of courts
and the accused's election as to the military judge, is worded permissively
concerning detail of the judge by the convening authority; and that a
bad conduct discharge "may" not be adjudged if the convening authority
decides not to allow, for example, a verbatim record to be kept. Thus,
it is not clear when the military judge must be assigned to the SPCM and
when he may be assigned. It is further suggested that this ambiguity
should be resolved by redrafting to prevent confusion resulting from these
two considerations: (1) If the convening authority may-as opposed to
must-detail the military judge when a bad conduct discharge is appropriate, what would be the effect of this detail on the court since the
members would realize the convening authority considers the punitive
discharge appropriate? (2) Because the Table of Maximum Punishments
authorizes a bad conduct discharge to be adjudged after a finding of guilty
when the accused has a record of two previous courts-martial within the
past year, should this fact bear on the question of whether accused with
such a record should automatically be guaranteed the right to have his
case heard by a court composed at least by a military judge?
197. FED. R. CRim. P. 23.
198. 113 CONC. REC. 8847 (daily ed. June 26, 1967). The one exception
is when death may be adjudged for the offense charged. Congress would
not permit the military judge to make this weighty decision alone. The
full court of a judge and at least five members is required. Id.
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though claims of "stacking" may have validity in some cases, the
better practice would be to also secure the approval of the military
judge as a condition to trial before that judge alone. This condition
precedent would be in accord with the judge's independence and
legal objectivity recognized in other provisions of the Act. The
military judge is in the best position to analyze the charge sheet
and the facts of the case to determine if the rights of the accused
would best be protected by a judge and a "jury," that is, the full
court of line officers plus the military trial judge.

One alternative which Congress has not considered is the military judge sitting alone at the request of the convening authority. Such a procedure would appear to affront the constitutional requirement that "Trial of all Crimes . . . shall be by Jury
.
"199
"... Trial by a common law jury, however, has been recog-

nized as a constitutional right which does not extend to military

accused.210 This is manifested by the present composition of the
courts-martial under the UCMJ.2 0 1 Therefore, assuming it is con-

stitutional, a single officer court would streamline the administration of military justice, especially in the extensively used SPCM.
At present, each time an accused successively waives nonjudicial
punishment and the summary court-martial, 2 2 and each time an

accused commits an offense appropriately tried by a SPCM, at
least

three servicemen-usually

officers-must

be taken from

other military duties to sit on the court. Superficially, three is not
a large number. Multiplied by a yearly total of forty thousand 0 3
special courts-martial, however, it can be seen that many manhours are spent away from other military duties essential to national defense. The defendant's objection to a single officer court
could be remedied by providing the right to elect trial by the full
court. In light of the demonstrated impartiality of the present law
officers, it is suggested that most defendants would not exercise
their option to be tried by a court composed of officers from within
their own command selected by the convening authority.
As
noted above, the constitutionality of first offering trial by the mili199. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
200. See United States v. Burney, 6 U.S.C.M.A. 776, 21 C.M.R. 98 (1956).
201. The UCMJ speaks only to minimum numbers: SCM, 1; SPCM,
3; GCM, 5. There is, theoretically, no maximum number and "12" is not a
required number in any case. The only mention of "peers" is that contained in Art. 25, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 25 (1964), which provides in part
that an enlisted accused may request that one-third of the court be composed of enlisted men, and that when it can be avoided, no member of
the court should be junior in rank or grade to the accused. The power of
Congress to set the composition of courts-martial, as well as the entire
UCMJ, is derived from the Constitution, art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall
have Power . . .To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces." The right to a grand jury indictment is also
excepted in the fifth amendment. U.S. CONST.amend. V.
202. See note 191 supra and accompanying text.
203. See note 189 supra.
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tary judge may be questionable. Any objection, however, would
seem to be met by allowing the accused the option of trial by the
full court.
C. Command Influence
The very existence of adverse influence exerted by a military
commander on the adjudicatory tribunals over which he has convening authority is a debatable question. Not only is the actual
presence of command influence conjectural, but the degree of presence and the proper ways to control it are likewise speculative.
Such influence can take many forms: direct influence, for example
lecturing a particular court or issuing command directives to imply or assert that discipline can be best furthered by more convictions; 20 4 indirect influence exerted by other staff officers such as
the unit executive officer or staff judge advocate; 20 5 and "imaginative" influences which might result from the inferences a court
member could draw because the commander "wouldn't convene a
court unless the accused was guilty."
Direct influences are most easily detected and corrected. As
indicated, this form is manifested by some direct action taken by
the convening authority toward the court. The UCMJ attempts 2to
0°
prohibit influence by the commander in two ways. Article 22(b)
disqualifies a commander from convening a court in which he is the
"accuser." By "accuser" is meant a person who signs and swears
to charges against the accused or who has other than an official
interest in the prosecution of the accused. 20 7 A combination of
two other articles 20 8 would make it a punishable offense for a commander to "censure, reprimand or admonish the court or any
member, law officer, or counsel thereof with respect to the findings
or sentence adjudged by the court, or with respect to any other9
20
exercise of its or his functions in the conduct of the proceeding.
Although the threat of punishment is present, no case invoking
these two articles has been reported.2 10 Those close to the situation, however, claim that direct influence rarely occurs,2 11 and if
it should arise it can be corrected on review by the Court of Mili204.

See, e.g., materials on command influence, submitted by Edward

S. Gogen, ACLU, 1966 Hearings 761-63; cf. United States v. Walinch, 8
U.S.C.M.A. 3, 23 C.M.R. 227 (1957).
205. See, e.g., United States v. Perry, cited in 1966 Hearings 302;
United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961); cf.
United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966); United
States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 30 C.M.R. 350 (1961).
206. Art. 22 (b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 822(b) (1964).
207. Art. 1(11), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 801(11) (1964).
208. Arts. 37, 98, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 837, 898 (1964).
209. Art. 37, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1964).
210. 1966 Hearings 302.
211. See generally the testimony of The Judge Advocates General,
1966 Hearings 54-61, 97-99.
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tary Appeals. 212 Two conflicting considerations bear on these observations. First, the decline in observable direct influence can be
attributed to nearly complete acceptance of the UCMJ provisions
prohibiting influence; on professional growth by present commanders under the UCMJ; and the decisive action taken by the Court
of Military Appeals in cases where command influence is claimed
and proved.2 13 The second observation tempers the first. Only a few
cases are reviewable by the highest military court. 214 Thus any
command influence exerted by lesser commanders on the lesser
tribunals under their jurisdiction would go undetected and uncorrected except by review in the field, where most lower court sentences are approved. Moreover, the present summary and special
courts-martial do not have lawyer-counsel who would be more
likely to recognize and protest any adverse influence. It is evident,
therefore, that the reassurances of the Judge Advocates General
and the Court of Military Appeals judges concerning the decline of
command influence are not completely valid. The suspicion of
its presence remains. The main consolation is that few, if any,
commanders were ever promoted because their command had a
large number of courts-martial convictions or because of adverse
influence on their courts.
Indirect influences by staff officers can be manifested in many
of the same ways as by commanders. Thus, actions by executive
officers or chiefs of staff are taken "in the name of the commander"
and the comments above would apply. Staff judge advocates present a slightly different problem. As the commander's legal advisors, these officers are equally attuned to his wishes, but must
nevertheless advise the commander from a lawyer's viewpoint.
Because the technical supervision of a command's courts-martial
system comes under his responsibility, the commander's staff legal
officer does have a direct interest in the outcome and conduct of
those courts-martial. Moreover, it is the staff judge advocate who
counsels the commander on the advisability of trying particular
cases. This officer's influence can be exerted in the following
ways: technical lectures given by the legal officer to the command
concerning courts-martial procedures; advice to subordinate commanders and non-lawyer counsel as to their courts-martial functions; and supervisory powers over the subordinate military attorneys in his office. Past cases and two recent Court of Military
212. See testimony of Chief Judge Quinn, Court of Military Appeals,
1966 Hearings 277-93. "I do feel ... that command control has been
largely eliminated." Id. at 283.
213. See discussion and cases cited in The Survey of the Law - Military
Justice: The United States Court of Military Appeals 29 November 1951 to
30 June 1958, 3 MIm. L. REV. 67 (1959); Fischer & Sides, A Supplement to
the Survey of Military Justice, 8 Mm. L. REv. 113 (1960); and other annual
supplements in 16 MTL. L. REv. 91 (1961), 20 Mm. L. REv. 116 (1963), 28
MIL. L. REV. 121 (1965).

214.

See notes 239-41 infra and accompanying text.
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Appeals decisions show that staff legal officers are in a position to
exert inflences which might be adverse to an accused.2 1 5 In
United States v. Albert 216 a divided court held that a lecture on
duties of court members given by a staff judge advocate to an entire command and attended by five of the seven members on accused's court was not prejudicial to the accused and did not deprive
him of a fair trial or a fair review of his conviction. Construing
the lecture as a whole, "because its impact upon prospective court
members can be judged only as a whole,"21 7 the majority found
the lecture to be "a rather common place discussion of the problems
in the selection of members of a court-martial and of the general
responsibilities of a court member. 218 Despite references by the
staff judge advocate to certain "inconsistent" sentences adjudged
in prior cases-which references the accused alleged were erroneous criticism and denied impartial review by that officer of accused's own sentence-the court determined that these references
,219 therewere not "exhortations for more severe sentences.
fore not prejudicial. The dissent took an opposite view, stating
that "the lecture here was intended to, and did, influence its
hearers to adjudge harsher sentences .... -220 The point is that
staff legal officers are in a position to exert influence if they so
wish. The more reasonable approach is that such lectures are
vitally necessary for the education of military members concerning the intricacies of criminal justice and are probably given to
educate, not to coerce. The staff legal officer, however, is placed
in a difficult position in which he must carefully mark his words
lest they be construed to be prejudicial to some present or future
accused.
A more insidious influence is that which a senior legal officer
can exert on subordinate attorneys, especially defense counsel assigned to his staff. In United States v. Kitchens22 ' it was brought
out on appeal that the staff judge advocate had rendered poor efficiency reports on defense counsel because they had zealously defended their clients. Such influence, if permitted to exist, would
215. See note 223 infra. Judge Ferguson's testimony about this area
is illuminating: "Seldom does one see a case in which a military commander directly takes issue with a court-martial or attempts to interfere
with it. Instead we find in almost every instance a staff judge advocate
tampering with the court in order to obtain a more favorable ratio of convictions and sentences." 1966 Hearings 302.
216. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 111, 36 C.M.R. 267 (1966).
217. Id. at 115, 36 C.M.R. at 271.
218. Id.
219. Id. See also United States v. Kitchens, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31
C.M.R. 175 (1961).
220. United States v. Albert, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 118, 36 C.M.R. 274 (1966)
(dissenting opinion). Cf. United States v. Danzine, 12 U.S.C.M.A. 350, 30
C.M.R. 350 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
221. 12 U.S.C.M.A. 589, 31 C.M.R. 175 (1961). See also United States
v. Perry, cited in 1966 Hearings 302.
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create difficult pressures for counsel who depend primarily on good
efficiency reports for promotion to higher ranks.
"Imaginative" inferences are the most difficult to detect, but
perhaps the most easily controlled and corrected. Thorough education of court members and the military in general concerning
the presumptions of innocence and burden of proof on the government should dispel undue influences generated by the mere convening of a court to try an accused. As seen, however, education in the
form of lectures can be the basis of appeal if not handled impartially.
Two other present methods of controlling imaginative inferences prejudicial to the accused are also not completely effective.
The presiding officer at SPCM and SCM are 222
line officers, not legally
223
trained law officers.

Although the UCMJ

and trial manuals

used by these presiding officers require the court to be charged
concerning the presumption of innocence and proof beyond reasonable doubt, greater room exists for misinterpretation when lay
personnel conduct the proceedings. Secondly, challenges for cause
are best detected on voir dire. The absence of military attorneys
at the lower tribunals, however, effectively precludes an assumption that grounds for challenge are sought by open inquiry of the
court. Indeed, it is more reasonable to conclude that lay counsel
do not know about voir dire, much less how to conduct it effectively.
The Act attempts to cope with the vagaries associated with
command influence. Although it was suggested that the better
solution would be to make such adverse influence a separate crime
punishable under federal law, 224 Congress rejected that affirmative
measure in favor of a more indirect and preventative approach.
By providing legally trained counsel for all accused at SPCM and
GCM, any adverse influence will hopefully be objected to by one
who is more independent of the commander than a "line" officer
and who possesses a more acute sense of justice. The Act forbids
written evaluation of a court member's performance of duty on the
court. 225

Also specifically prohibited is a derogatory efficiency

2 26
rating becase of the zeal with which counsel defends an accused.
As noted, the independent "field judiciary" will uniformly remove
the law officer/military judge from direct or indirect influence of
the commander who convenes the court-martial.,
The possibility of command influence will always exist in an
organization which places ultimate responsibility in the name of the

222. Art. 51(c) (1-4), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 851(c) (1-4) (1964).
223. See, e.g., Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 27-15, "Military
Justice Handbook, Trial Guide for the Special Court-Martial President"
(1965).
224. See, e.g., 1966 Hearings 191, 299.
225. 113 CoNc. REc. 8848 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
226. Id.
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commander. Fortunately, past records indicate that
instances of command influence have been comparatively
rare under the Code. However, when the [Court of Military Appeals] has found it to exist, condemnation of the
exercise of improper control has been swift and decisive.
The problem in this area is to insure every accused a trial
free from unlawful influence and at the same time not to
restrict 2 a27 commander unduly in his exercise of military discipline.

Although charged with the responsibility of disciplining his unit,
the commander must also enforce that discipline in a just manner.
Like civilian society, the commander is asked to find the offender,
bring him to an impartial court, and then remain entirely out of the
trial proceedings. 228 Unlike civilian society, however, the commander has the additional responsibility of molding his command
for combat in which defective personnel may mean defeat and
death. It is thus reasonable to understand the delicate position
of the commander in dispensing discipline and justice in the military. The Act incorporates changes which further restrict the
commander and his staff from influencing courts convened under
their authority. The changes are not so obvious as to make him
fearful of enforcing discipline. It is submitted that Congress has
struck a proper balance on a problem that lacks precise definition,
evaluation, or control.
D. Review
Present procedures for review of courts-martial are considered
excellent. "The elaborate system of automatic and discretionary
review found in military courts offers greater protection to a defendant before a court-martial than he would receive in civilian
courts.' ' 2 29

Congress seeks to better the system by increasing the

review authority of the Judge Advocates General, by reorganizing
the level of review just below the Court of Military Appeals, and
by expanding the circumstances under which a new trial may be
requested.
At present, trial records for those GCM and SPCM cases which
involve, inter alia, a sentence of punitive discharge or confinement
of one year or more are automatically reviewed by a board of review.2a° Further review by the Court of Military Appeals is at
the discretion of the Judge Advocate General, or upon the court's
227. Survey of The Law of Justice: The United States Court of Military
Appeals 29 November 1951 to 30 June 1958, 3 MIL. L. REV. 67, 74 (1959).
228. Cf. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
229. Quoted by Judge Kilday, Court of Military Appeals, 1966 Hearings
298, from 63 MIcH. L. REV. 168, 170-71 (1964).
230. Art. 66(b), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866(b) (1964). This article also
provides for automatic review in the less frequent cases involving a
general or flag officer, death sentence, or dismissal of a commissioned officer, cadet or midshipman.

Fall 1967]

COMMENTS

acceptance of an accused's petition.2"' All other GMC trial records in which there has been a finding of guilt and a sentence are
reviewed in the office of the respective Judge Advocate General for
possible forwarding to a board of review, and for automatic review
if any part of the findings or sentence is found to be unsupported
22
in law or fact.

For all other SPCM and all SCM, the final automatic review
occurs "in the field," that is, below the departmental level. There
are no provisions for a higher appellate review, either discretionary or automatic. An accused who alleges prejudicial error by the
court, but who was not awarded a punitive discharge or confinement greater than one year, must look outside the appellate chain
for a hearing on his claim. There is little doubt that prejudicial
error can and probably does occur in these cases. This assertion
is strengthened by the present practice of not appointing legally
qualified counsel to special and summary courts-martial. Therefore
the entire burden of seeking out and correcting prejudicial error
lies with the staff judge advocate who serves the field authority
which approves the sentence.
The Act proposes to fill the void of discretionary review of
summary and special courts-martial. While leaving the detailed
procedures to be formulated by the Judge Advocates General, the
Act provides that an accused can petition the JAG of his service
to review his case on the following grounds: newly discovered
evidence, fraud on the court, lack of jurisdiction, or error prejudicial to the substantial rights of the accused.233 Upon finding a
basis for one or more of these grounds, the JAG may vacate or
23 4
modify any part of the findings or sentence.
The new review authority proposed for the JAG will undoubtedly create an increased burden for the offices of the Judge Advocates General. SPCM and SCM constitute the great majority of
cases now being tried in the military.23 5 Even assuming that few
cases contain error of the type to be recognizable by the JAG, the
mandatory presence of attorney-counsel at SPCM will render a
petition more likely. No time limit has been established within
which a petitioner must request review by the JAG, 2 6 a further
hint of ambiguity and difficulty in administering this provision.
Although administratively burdensome, the proposed review
authority is an important advance for those convicted at the lesser
courts-martial. A finding of guilt by these courts is no less a federal conviction than by those courts which can impose greater pun231. Arts. 67(b) (2), (3), UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. §§ 867(b) (2), (3) (1964).

The Court of Military Appeals automatically reviews sentences involving
a general or flag officer, and death.
232. Art. 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1964).
233. 113 CoNG. REc. 8850 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
234. Id.
235. See note 189 supra.
236. See 113 CONG. REc. 8850 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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ishments. Indeed there are many servicemen who would rather
accept a punitive discharge than a sentence of confinement at hard
labor, although the lasting effect of the former is undoubtedly
the harsher penalty. In any event, it is suggested that the added
burden of reviewing such cases is outweighed by the important
appellate relief in the office of the official who must be vitally
concerned with the brand of justice being dispensed in his legal
"field."
A second major change in review procedure concerns the presently named "boards of review.

2 37

These boards are in reality

intermediate courts with vast review power. The Act proposes to
recognize their true status by renaming them Courts of Military
Review. 238 The review authority and procedures of the present
boards will remain substantially the same under the reorganization.
One additional power granted to the new court is the authority
to suspend all or any part of the sentence. 239 This authority may
appear questionable since a suspension is generally a matter of clemency more properly exercised by the convening authority based
on intimate knowledge of the individual, the facts of the case, and
the needs of his unit. Despite the internal controversies which
may arise because the Act requires that at least one-third of the
court must be civilians, 240 the reorganization of and independence
for the present boards of review will provide this military tribunal
with a decorum appropriate to a federal appellate court of comparable jurisdiction.
To bring the military in line with federal procedures, the Act
2 42
incorporates a provision granting two years241 instead of one year
within which to petition for a new trial. The grounds remain the
same-newly discovered evidence or fraud on the court. One proposed change, however, is especially significant. At present an accused can ask for a new trial only in cases involving certain punishments. 24 3 Under the proposed Act, Congress corrects this
237. See Art. 66, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 866 (1964).
238. 113 CONG. REc. 8849 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
239. Id.
240. The basic controversy: the military asserts that civilians on the
court means less career incentives and openings for professional military
lawyers and that undoubtedly problems will arise in combat situations;
others advocate that civilians will provide a salutary check on the military similar to the much respected Court of Military Appeals and that
the civilians will provide continuity to the court because the term is only
for three years, after which the military more probably would be reassigned or retired. Quare, will the unwholesome effect be that the chief
judgeships will eventually all go to civilians since they presumably will
be reappointed term after term, thus becoming the most senior and, undoubtedly, acquiring the more impeccable judicial and administrative
abilities.
241. See FED. R. Cinv. P. 33.
242. Art. 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964).

243.

The punishments are of the more severe category, and for the

most part constitute identical grounds for automatic appellate review:
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arbitrary distinction and contemplates that an accused2 44convicted
by any court-martial can petition the JAG for a new trial.
Considered separately, the foregoing changes provide acceptable and ameliorative review avenues. Taken collectively, as must
be done under a system regulated by one code, one must wonder if
all the changes are necessary to protect an accused from possible
injustice. For example, an accused convicted of a minor offense
at a SCM has available the following new petitions for relief: unlimited time within which to petition for modification or vacation
of the findings or sentence; 245 two years within which to petition
the JAG for a new trial based on two grounds duplicated in the
unlimited petition; 246 and, as will be seen, three years within which
to petition the Board for Correction of Military' Records to modify,
set aside, or expunge any part of the findings or sentence based on
equitable grounds supporting an error to be corrected or an injustice to be removed.2 47 Close analysis reveals the individual function of each of these review procedures. It is suggested, however,
that the extent of rights accorded an accused at the lesser tribunals
should not be unreasonable. Where to draw the line between sufficient protection for the individual and sufficient resources to administrate these protective devices is a difficult decision. Because
there are substantial differences between a summary and a general
court-martial, it is recommended that Congress re-evaluate the proposed review procedures available to all *courts. A compromise
should be effected so that commensurate consideration can be
afforded the petitions related to each type of court-martial. The
original Code draftsmen saw fit to exclude petitions from certain
courts-martial on the basis of the punishment imposed. 248 If Congress desires to change this scheme to grant further review for all
courts-martial, it is submitted that specific rules should be proposed for each of the various courts.

IV. CONSOLIDATED BoARD FOR CORRFCTION OF MILITARY REcoRDS
Pursuant to statutory authority, 249 each military department
has a civilian board with broad equity powers to "correct an error
or remove an injustice 250 found in any records of individuals in
that branch of service. An indication of the breadth of equitable
jurisdiction is found in this concise summary of one board's activideath, dismissal- (officers only), dishonorable or bad conduct discharge,
or confinement for one year or more. Compare Article 73 with Article 66.
Ironically, a general or flag officer, not -dismissed pursuant to a courtmartial sentence, has no present recourse to petition for a new trial.
244. 113 CONG. REC. 8850 (daily ed.'June.26, 1967).
245. See notes 242, 243 supra and accompanying text.
246. See note 252 infra and accompanying text.
247. See 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964). See dlso part IV infra.
248. Art. 73, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 873 (1964).
249. 10 U.S.C. § 1552 (1964).
250. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1964).
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ties:
The Army Board for Correction of Military Records has
received applications from individuals varying in age from
15 to 85 years and from widows, legal representatives and
next of kin including children and grandchildren of servicemen in grades of recruit to lieutenant general. The periods
of service involved here have extended from the Revolutionary War to the current year, and have covered
almost
25 1
every phase of experience in a soldier's career.
The Act proposes to consolidate, clarify and enlarge the present
powers of the individual service boards. The service boards will
be replaced by a nine man board established in the Department of
Defense. 2 2 This may appear to be a mere formality since this
Board is almost certain to divide into three possibly informal subboards for the three major departments. Consolidation in the Department of Defense, however, means that this Board will be more
independent of the individual service secretaries. Presently, the
respective board findings are subject to approval by the secretary
concerned.2 53 The Act proposes that the Board must only solicit
the views of the secretary and it can correct an error or removal
an injustice pertaining to any military record. 254 The Board's action will be final and binding on all officers of the United
States. 255
The independence of the proposed Board will have a salutary
effect on the number and disposition of cases now considered by
the individual boards. It has been complained that because the
present boards are manned on a part-time basis they cannot give
adequate consideration to each application for relief.25 6 Moreover,
since the individual boards are the final administrative agency
with equitable powers, a disapproval by the secretary leaves the
applicant without further internal remedy. These conditions have
prompted litigation in the Court of Claims or federal district
courts.

25 1

The new board will undoubtedly be staffed by full-time

members and should be able to fully consider the equities in each
case. In conjunction with its authority to make final determina251. Williams, The Army Board for Correction of Military Records,
6 MnL. L. REV. 41, 42, as quoted from Memorandum of Chairman, ABCMR,
4 December 1957.
252. 113 CONG. REC. 8850 (daily ed. June 16, 1967). Separate authority
is granted for the Coast Guard. Id.
253. 10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1964).
The secretary's decisions are not
outside the scope of judicial review. If the secretary disregards a finding
by the Board for the petitioner, the latter can get relief in the Court of
Claims if he shows that the secretary's action was not supported by the
evidence and record, thus was arbitrary. See Betts v. United States, 172
F. Supp. 450 (Ct. Cl. 1959); Elicks v. United States, 172 F. Supp. 445

(Ct. Cl. 1959).

254. 113 CoNG. REc. 8850 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
255. Id.
256. 1966 Hearings 260; cf. 1966 Hearings 1039.
257. See note 253 supra.

Fall 1967]

COMMENTS

tions, the full-time status of the proposed Board will hopefully decrease the need for collateral litigation in federal courts. Assuming that is a desirable end, it must be noted that there is no provision for a hearing before the Board as a matter of right. This is
also the present situation. Those denied a hearing, therefore, will
still have to seek relief in the courts.
Two proposed changes will enlarge the powers granted to the
present boards. Like the internal administrative Discharge Review
Boards 25 1 and boards of officers, 259 the Correction Boards currently
lack the power to subpoena necessary witnesses and records. The
Act would extend this power to the Defense Board, 260 thereby enabling the petitioner and Board to bring in important oral and written testimony for a full hearing of the case. The absence of this
power has undoubtedly also prompted petitioners to seek the more
complete discovery and subpoena relief afforded by federal courts.
Of course, part of this problem is alleviated under the Act by giving
the administrative discharge boards the power of subpoena. Thus
a full and developed record should be available for the Correction
Board unless the complaint centers on a denial of the discharge
board to exercise its power. The power to subpoena will, however,
be extremely beneficial to those discharge cases where no board
hearing is given as a matter of right, for example on grounds of
"unsuitablility."
The second change mentioned would enlarge and clarify the
power of the Board to deal with courts-martial findings and sentences. As noted, the present boards have the power to "correct any
military record . . . to correct an error or remove an injustice."2 6'
Article 76 of the UCMJ, however, attempts to finalize previously
reviewed courts-martial findings and sentences which shall be
"binding upon all departments, courts, agencies, and officers of
the United States, subject only to action upon a petition for a new
trial. ....
,,262Thus the power of the present boards to materially
alter the actual records of trial is clearly in doubt.263 Although
the boards may strike an entry of conviction from other records of
a serviceman, direct action to modify a finding or sentence, or to
completely eradicate the entire record of trial encompasses a much
broader exercise of administrative "equity."
Despite the finality intended by article 76, the objections to
review of a court verdict by an administrative agency, and the increased powers in the Judge Advocates General to correct errors
in records not reviewed by the Court of Military Review, Congress
intends to grant the Board the power to "modify, set aside, or ex258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
(1949),

10 U.S.C. § 1553 (1964).
See note 31 supra.
113 CoNc.REc. 8851 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
10 U.S.C. § 1552(a) (1964).
Art. 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1964).
Compare 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 504 (1947), 40 Ops. Att'y Gen. 8
and 35 Comp. Gen. 302 (1955) with 1966 Hearings 42, 69.
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punge the findings or sentence, or both, of a court-martial case not
received by a Court of Military Review pursuant to section 866
[article 66] of this title. .... -164 In effect, the Board can grant
complete relief to an accused convicted by a SCM, or by a special or
general court-martial not awarding him a punitive discharge or at
least one year confinement. This would allow the accused a second
application for relief, since, as noted, the JAG would have similar
powers under the Act.
While it does not appear totally objectionable for a convicted
accused to have recourse to an independent administrative agency
possessing equitable powers, certain difficulties are presented by
the Board's intended jurisdiction over courts-martial. The Board's
authority to "modify" a sentence or finding could lead to the anomalous situation of the Board issuing a discretionary order affecting
any or all of the possible punishments which can be awarded by a
court-martial. For example, the Board could eliminate any confinement but "affirm" the remaining sentence of forfeitures, thus
leaving the accused on active duty without pay. It also could arbitrarily nullify a reduction in grade and forfeiture of pay, although leaving an accused in confinement to draw full pay and
allowances. The probability of the Board acting capriciously is not
raised here. It is questionable, however, to grant an administrative
agency jurisdiction to selectively modify findings and sentences in
the same manner as the more qualified tribunals in the normal
appellate chain of review.
Another incongruous situation could arise under article 69 of
the UCMJ.2 6 5 Pursuant to this article certain GCM cases not previously reviewed by a board of review (Court of Military Review)
can be eventually reviewed by the Court of Military Appeals. The
Act specifically exempts from review by the Correction Board only
those cases which automatically go to a board of review and then
to the Court of Military Appeals. Thus, the administrative Board
has the implied authority to "overrule" the decision of either the
proposed Court of Military Review or the Court of Military Appeals
in those GCM cases which are transmitted to them by the Judge
Advocates General pursuant to article 69. It is submitted that it is
both unnecessary and improper to provide the Board with such a
grant of power, especially the power to modify a sentence deemed
legally sufficient by the courts established for that purpose.
V.

ESTABLISHMENT OF A NAVY JuDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS

The formation of an independent Judge Advocate General's
Corps (hereafter JAGC) in the Navy 266 has long been advocated
264. 113 CONG. REC. 8850 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
265. Art. 69, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1964).
266. 113 CONG. REC. 8845-47 (daily ed. June 26, 1967).
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both within 2 7 and without the military. 2 8 The range of expressed
approval falls within the following: "Any legislation which promotes the professionalism of attorneys in the military is worthy
of support. The military attorney, to the extent he exerts himself
as an attorney, is the most important safeguard to the rights of the
individual. '26 9 And,
Under the Navy's existing system officers performing law
specialist duties are in a restricted line, special duty category to which persons with legal training are appointed.
Such officers often must be both line officers as well as
legal officers. This bill2 70 is intended to enhance the independence of lawyers
in the Navy and to attract lawyers of
271
greater ability.
A separate JAGC for the Navy attorney will have both a direct
and indirect effect on the military justice system. At present,
these attorneys are entitled "Law Specialists." This means that
they are aligned under the Navy unit commander and compete with
other line and command-oriented officers for promotion. Thus,
their efficiency ratings are not judged solely on their abilities as
lawyers. This system derogates the freedom within which a lawyer
must work in order to best serve his clients and his professional
growth. "When a lawyer knows that a person not a lawyer is to
control his future, and his ability to rise to the top of his legal
field is controlled by someone not a lawyer, his efficiency, morale
,,272
and his independence are destroyed ....
The Navy JAGC would only provide partial uniformity among
the services. The Army presently enjoys the status and independence of having a separate legal corps. The Act fails to include
similar statutory recognition for legal personnel in the Marine
Corps, Air Force, or Coast Guard. The rationale for these omissions
is that these services do not practically lend themselves to segregation of legal officers into a separate corps: the Marine Corps
267. See statement of Rear Admiral William Mott, then Judge Advocate General of the Navy, 1962 Hearings 401: "I am in favor of the JAG
Corps, because I think it would be better not only for the purposes and aims
of this committee, but it would be better for the Navy. I think a JAG
Corps will make it easier to recruit lawyers, it will be easier to retain
them, and we will be able to give our client, the Navy, better service."
268. In particular, see written statements of American Legion Subcommittee on Uniform Code of Military Justice, 1966 Hearings 168-69;
1962 Hearings 414-22.
269. Statement of Herbert Marks, attorney, Washington, D.C., 1966
Hearings 223.
270. S.746, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). For the text of this bill and
accompanying memorandum, see 109 CONG. REc. 13354 (daily ed. Aug. 6,
1963).
271. Department of Defense Summary of Bills, S.745-760, 1966 Hearings 456.

272. American Legion Special Subcommittee Report on the UCMJ 14,

reproduced in 1962 Hearings 416.
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looks with favor upon the well-rounded Marine officer who is encouraged to take2 7 non-legal
assignments; 2 3 the Air Force has no
"corps" as such; 4 and the Coast Guard is too small..2 75 Such
practical considerations are persuasive when considered in light of
the varying missions and physical structures among the services.
It may also be emphasizing form over substance to assert that a
mere statute creating a "separate" corps would automatically lead
to independent legal effort, a type of independence which could not
be attained by any class of dedicated lawyers sincerely guided by
legal ethics. Certainly there is no evidence that military attorneys
have not risen to the challenge 7 6 of combining two professions
which ask pure dedication from those who seek to be a "lawyer in
the military." It is nevertheless difficult to understand why the
reasoning which motivates universal application of the field judiciary system 277 and formation of a JAGC for the Navy is not
strong enough for application to the Marine Corps, Air Force and
Coast Guard. It would make the challenge of the military lawyer
easier to meet, be indirectly beneficial to military clients, and serve
as an attraction to young lawyers considering a career in the
military. It would, in short, be completely in line with the spirit
of the Act: to insure the best possible protection for rights of the
individual.
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing has been of necessity only a cursory treatment
of the numerous changes and complexities of the proposed Act.
Some technical, yet procedurally important, amendments have not
been noted in the text. The sections of the omnibus bill which
have been commented upon nevertheless reflect the intent of Congress and the importance of the Military Justice Act of 1967. Many
provisions have an operational or administrative overtone, but the
main theme of the Act is to provide better forums and protective
devices to insure that the individual in the military receives due
process by adjudicative tribunals. Some provisions are technically
objectionable. The main theme, however, seems desirable and feasible.
The proposals concerning administrative discharge procedures,
for example, are as sweeping in that field as was the UCMJ in the
criminal field in 1950. Experience under that Code has indicated
that it was farsighted and promoted the attainment of real justice.
The military adapted to it. Now many new proposals, equally far273. 1966 Hearings46.
274. Id. at 51.
275. Id. at 53.
276. See, e.g., Murphy, The Army Defense Counsel: Unusual Ethics
for an Unusual Advocate, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 233 (1961); Horton, Professional Ethics and the Military Defense Counsel, 5 MiL. L. REv. 67
(1959).
277. See notes 192-202 supra and accompanying text.
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reaching but in harmony with civilian practices, are presented in
this Act. Despite the administrative complications which might
ensue, the military can undoubtedly adapt to this Act if it becomes
law. The only alternative would seem to be that contemplated by
Professor Morgan when he commented on the UCMJ experience
in the military:
If experience under the Code shows that the influence of
command control has not been eliminated, it may well be
that a new system will have to be established in which the
military will have control only over the processes of prosecution, and the defense, trial and review be under the exclusive control of civilians. The services have the opportunity of demonstrating to Congress that the concessions
made in the Code to the demands for effective discipline do
not impair the essentials27 Sof a fair, impartial trial and effective appellate review.

This observation is equally pertinent to the changes to the admistrative and criminal justice systems embodied in the proposed
Military Justice Act of 1967.
BARRETT S. HAIGHT

278. Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of Military Justice,
6 VAND. L. REV. 169, 184 (1953).

